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This thesis reviews the development and application of
current non-tactical shipboard ADP systems in the U.S. Navy,
and provides an analysis of each systems' strengths and
weaknesses. The primary focus of this review includes
Perq/ZOG, WANG installations, and SNAP II. The
methodologies of procurement, development and implemenation
vary as widely as the scope and complexity of the various
systems. This analysis provides insight into some primary
management issues, limitations, and constraits encountered
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I. INTRODUCTION
"For want of a nail the shoe is lost, for want of a shoe
the horse is lost, for want of a horse the rider is
lost". [Ref. 1]
These familiar words from an old verse still ring true
today, except with the U.S. Navy, the proverbial nail has
been replaced by the small, modern, non-tactical computer.
Since the late 1970' s, there has been a proliferation of
computers on board the ships and vessels of the U.S. Navy,
which has served to revolutionize the processing of
information at sea. These small processers have generally
increased the productivity of ship's administrative
personnel by allowing each man to produce more information
of a higher quality than was previously possible in a manual
mode. They have also provided the Commanding Officer and his
key assistants with more timely information on which to base
their everyday management decisions.
Along with these benefits, the introduction of the small
non-tactical computer into the shipboard environment has
exacerbated the ongoing concerns of security and
standardization, while introducing many new issues that must
be dealt with, such as control of computer resources and
dependency on systems that could cease to function at any
time in the harsh at-sea environment of a ship.
The objective of this thesis is not to identify and
analyze all the systems presently implemented on board Naval
ships, but to survey a few of them in regards to their
architecture, benefits, and unique technical and managerial
problems
.
This thesis focuses on three distinct computer
installations that are currently implemented on board U.S.
Naval ships. Chapter Two looks at a system of Perq
minicomputers installed on board the U.S.S. Carl Vinson that
run an experimental menu-driven, distributed database called
ZOG. 20G was developed at Carnegie- Mellon University with
support from both the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the
Defense Advanced Research Agency (DARPA) . Chapter Three
addresses the WANG VS-100 which is also installed on board
the U.S.S. Carl Vinson. It was selected for inclusion in
this thesis because it is an off-the-shelf commercial system
that has been installed and operated without being
specifically designed or altered for the shipboard
environment. This system was also developed without the
benefit of government support. Chapter Four discusses the
SNAP system, which is presently being placed on board all
naval ships. This system comes in two versions, the
Honeywell SNAP I system is for large ships, and the Harris
SNAP II system is for smaller ones. Both of these systems,
which are centrally procured and managed by the Navy, have
been specifically ruggedized for a shipboard environment.
Chapter Five consolidates some of the conclusions that have
been drawn from the other chapters.
While this thesis does not attempt to analyze the whole
spectrum of problems concerning non-tactical automation that
is now being addressed in the fleet, it does attempt to
survey many of them from the viewpoint of the professional
naval officer. However, a concerted effort has been made
to define or describe terms unique to the Navy or shipboard





In 1981, a non-tactical computer system consisting of
twenty-eight Perq minicomputers and the prototype software
called ZOG was installed on board the Navy's new aircraft
carrier, the U.S.S. CARL VINSON. These minicomputers were
state-of-the art technology, offering the user a choice
between mouse technology or a detachable keyboard for
accessing the ZOG system. Each Perq minicomputer was also
configured with a hardware graphics tablet for the mouse,
one megabyte of random access memory, four thousand bytes of
writable control storage, and a twenty-four megabyte
Winchester hard disk storage drive. All the Perq
minicomputers were connected in a local area network by a
lOmz Ethernet.
The heart of this system was ZOG, an experimental,
human-computer interface conceived and developed at
Carnegie-Mellon University in the early 1970' s. It is the
transfer of ZOG technology from the research laboratory of
academe to the operational shipboard environment of the




ZOG was initially conceived and developed in 1972 as
part of a summer workshop held at Carnegie-Mellon University
(CMU) for cognitive psychologists studying simulation
[Ref. 2]. The original intent of ZOG was to provide a
system that would allow new users to access and explore
large complex programs. Although the concept proved
workable, lack of a fast terminal input/output device made
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the actual system too slow. At that time, state of the art
terminal technology was limited to 300 baud with hardcopy
output. Hence, the system was shelved until more advanced
hardware and communication technology became available.
In 1975 Alan Newell and George Robertson, two of the
original developers of ZOG, served on a technical advisory
committee for PROMIS (Problem Oriented Medical Information
System); a system strikingly similar to the ZOG concept, but
which utilized the latest in hardware technology. PROMIS was
conceived by DR. Lawrence Weed of the University of Vermont
Medical School. It was a combination of a management
information system and a menu guidance system that was
billed as a comprehensive approach to health care. [Ref. 3]
PROMIS used a Sperry-Univac V77-600 minicomputer with 250k
ram, three Control Data Corporation Storage Module Drives (
250 megacharacters per spindle ) and associated peripherals
per node. The user interfaced the computer via a high speed
( approximately 1/2 second access time) CRT terminal, which
incorporated a touch sensitive screen as well as a standard
keyboard [Ref. 4].
This demonstrated use of modern high speed terminal
technology in the PROMIS system resulted in revived interest
in ZOG at Carnegie-Mellon University. With support from both
the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the Defense Advanced
Research Agency' (DARPA), newer versions of ZOG were
developed and brought up on the university's PDP-10, first
using a Tops 10 and then a TOPS 20 operating system. ZOG was
also installed on the university's experimental
multiprocessor, C . MMP . By 1980 Carnegie-Mellon researchers
were successfully running ZOG on a new Ethernet local area
network, which connected the university's PDP-lOs, Xerox
Altos, and new DEC Vax computers. [Ref. 5]
There were two occurrences in 1980 that had major impact
on ZOG's development. One was the implementation of SPICE,
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(Scientific Personal Integrated Computing Environment) as a
research project at Carnegie-Mellon. Since several of the
researchers working on SPICE had also worked on ZOG, it was
inevitable that the two systems would be closely affiliated.
Informal relationships that occurred because of this close
affiliation were reinforced as a result of a conscious
decision made by researchers at Carnegie-Mellon to
eventually integrate all software projects at the university
with SPICE. As a direct result of this decision, the Perq
minicomputer from the Three Rivers Computer Corporation that
was selected for initial SPICE implementation, was
ultimately selected for ZOG when it was moved from the
research to the operational arena. [Ref. 6]
The other occurrence was a visit to Carnegie-Mellon by
Navy Captain Richard Martin, the prospective commanding
officer of the nuclear powered aircraft carrier, U.S.S.
CARL VINSON, then under construction in Newport News,
Virginia
.
Captain Martin was visiting several ONR research sites
throughout the country to familiarize himself with the
latest developments in various technical areas. His purpose
at Carnegie-Mellon was to ascertain what advanced computer
technology was available that might prove useful on board
the U.S.S CARL VINSON. His initial encounter with ZOG at
Carnegie-Mellon convinced Captain Martin that a marriage
between the new software technology and the U.S.S. CARL
VINSON would serve two purposes.
1. It would supply the ONR/DARPA supported research at
CMU with an operational test bed, and
2. It would give U.S.S CARL VINSON the latest in
computer technology to help manage the carrier's
extensive administration requirements in the areas of
management, maintenance, and planning.
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To evolve ZOG to a point where it could be implemented
on board U.S.S. CARL VINSON, a formal ZOG Technological
Demonstration Project was established in March 1981. Its
goals were to get fleet personnel involved as soon as
possible in the ZOG project, to accelerate application
development to more closely conform with U.S.S CARL VINSON'S
commissioning and trial schedules, and to expand the
functional span and quality of the final product [Ref. 7].
Three shipboard areas were initially selected to use ZOG.
These included on-line creation of the Ship's Organization
and Regulations Manual (SORM), administration planning and
evaluation, and weapons elevator maintenance training.
C. THE NATURE OF ZOG
Thus far, we have only briefly described the evolution
of the Perq/ZOG system from its beginnings at
Carnegie-Mellon University in the early seventies, to the
establishment of a formal ZOG Technological Project in March
1981. We have not specifically defined nor completely
described ZOG. What is ZOG? How does it differ from the
numerous other software concepts that were being discussed
and developed in universities, research institutions, and
commercial laboratories throughout the 1970 's and early
1980' s? These and similar type issues must be discussed
before ZOG's potential impact can be analyzed and evaluated.
1 . Essence of ZOG
ZOG has been described as "a rapid-response,
large-network, menu-selection computer interface" [Ref. 8].
In less succinct words, it is an extremely fast, distributed
data-base that is driven by menus called display frames.
These display frames are the essence of ZOG. The function of
a display frame is to present information to the user and
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allow him to jump to another frame when finished with the
one he is currently on. With few exceptions, the degree of
information that can fit on the standard terminal screen is
the maximum amount of information allowed in one display
frame. This limitation does not present many problems,
however. Since the Perq' s high resolution screen actually
allows two full frame menus to be displayed at a time, the
user does not require a scrolling function when viewing
data. The first information item on a display frame is the
frame's title line. It can consist of a variable length
title and a short summary of the frame's contents. The
second information item is the frame's text. It further
expounds on the frame's main point of information. The third
information section constitutes a list of numbered options.
An option can consist of the title of a subsequent frame,
which when activated will move the user to that particular
frame. Options can also be used like subpoints of the frame
text as in an outline [Ref. 9]. If we envision the entire
database as a tree structure, and each menu as a parent
node, we can view the children of each parent node as frames
accessible through options. A fourth information item on the
frame is the set of local pads. Local pads are used to
invoke programs or point to extrinsic information. Using the
tree analogy, local pads on the menu could point to frames
or nodes in a totally different tree vice that of the
frame's children. They are cross reference links. The final
information item on a display frame consist of the global
pad set. These pads perform often repeated actions e.g. go
into edit, go to the previous frame, find information, help,
etc
.
Thousands of these frames can be connected together
to form what is called a "subnet". Subnets are functional
groupings of menus that form some report, program, or other
entity when interconnected.
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2 . ZOG and User Integration
When interacting with ZOG, the user is in one of
three modes. He is either navigating, invoking a program,
or editing [Ref. 10]. Navigation is the act of making a
selection of an option, local pad, or global pad by way of
the mouse pointing device or keyboard. The system reacts by
replacing the current display frame with that of the new
selection.
Embedded within ZOG are agents (application and
utility programs) written in the Pascal language. These
agents are used in planning and document writing, or as
interface drivers for input/output devices. Because ZOG
supports a programming environment these programs can be
written and implemented into the database by the user
himself.
If the user desires to invoke an agent embedded
within ZOG, he usually navigates to a particular display
frame on which the program is listed as an action item,
fills in the required parameters, and then selects the
action. McCracken and Akscyn describe an action item as:
"A sequence of commands in the ZOG action language -- a
simple programming language. This language contains
commands for traversing the network, invoking intrinsic
utilities, and entering the editor." [Ref. 11]
The third area of interaction between ZOG and the
user is editing. Onboard the U.S.S. CARL VINSON, a user has
the choice of two different editors. The principle editor is
ZED (ZOG edit). ZED is a frame editor that is used for
making changes to the database. Its main purpose is to
provide an instrument for creating new frames, changing
links between frames, or editing the contents of existing
frames. ZED can be invoked from any frame via the "edit"
global pad. A second editor called SLED (slot edit) is also
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available within ZOG. This editor has proved much easier to
use than ZED, but unlike ZED, it cannot be used to create
frames. SLED is designed for use in applications that
require fast, accurate input or editing of information. It
is especially useful in running ZOG agents. SLED has a built
in error-checking capability that matches input dates,
times, frame, subnets, and other pertinent information
against its data base to ensure their validity. With its
pop-up type menu and default value display, SLED allows the
user to quickly input required parameters for an agent by
invoking electronic toggle switches with the mouse or
keyboard. One application that relies heavily on SLED is the
"expert" system called AIRPLAN. AIRPLAN is used by the air
operations officer in monitoring and controlling aircraft.
When aircraft data is loaded into the system it is checked
against the ZOG database to ensure that relevant information
concerning the pilot, aircraft, and mission correlates with
what is in the database. These parameters, as well as the
parameters required by all agents, are entered by using
SLED. AIRPLAN will be discussed at a later point in this
paper.
D. ZOG AND THE U.S.S. CARL VINSON
In evaluating a system such as ZOG, several criterion
must first be established with which the system can be
measured and compared. Still, regardless of how careful
these criterion are chosen, a system can seldom be deemed
either a total failure or a total success. More often than
not it lies in the proverbial gray area in which it is a
success in one arena, a failure in a second, and
indeterminate in a third.
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1 . Criterion for Success
Criterion used in evaluating ZOG will vary with the
perspective from which it is being viewed, the
interpretation of common measures, and the individual's
knowledge of the environment in which the system is
utilized.
A battle group commander, for example, may consider
the system a failure because it cannot use standard software
already developed and distributed throughout the fleet. An
individual commanding officer may view this same system as a
success, because it gives him the information he requires at
the time he needs it. The user/technician may view the
system as unsuccessful, because it is difficult to operate
and maintain. Each observation is valid, yet leads to
different conclusions.
One common criterion heavily used in evaluating ZOG
was usage. Newell stated that "ZOG is a success to the
extent that it becomes used for actual operations, and to
the extent that such use continues and expands" [Ref. 12].
This supposition was affirmed by Van Matre, Moy, and McCann
as, "the best measure of system success is the use or
non-use of the system" [Ref. 13]. While this premise
appears reasonable, its use should be tempered with a
thorough knowledge of the environment in which the system is
utilized, otherwise, erroneous results may occur.
Low usage of the Perq/ZOG system may not be
significant on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON because the ship
has other non-tactical computer systems that can duplicate
many of its applications, e.g. WANG-Net, Snap, etc. Also
there are other less apparent factors that could account
for this low usage. An example of thes is evident in the
SORM. (Ship's Organization And Regulations Manual).
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The SORM is a ship's document that gives detailed
instructions on the daily routine to be followed by a ship.
It is developed and tailored by ship's personnel
specifically for their ship. The SORM is a dynamic document
that reflects the philosophy of the commanding officer, but
follows the format and guidelines of the Navy's SORM,
OPNAVINST 3120.32 (Operational Navy Instruction 3120.32).
OPNAVINST 3120.32 can function as the ship's SORM with a few
page insertions and some pen and ink changes, as is often
done on smaller vessels. Consequently, development of a
shipboard version is usually of low priority compared to
more pressing documentation. Therefore, low usage on a SORM
subnet could lead to an erroneous interpretation and
conclusion about ZOG's suitability for developing this
particular type of documentation. In reality, the usage or
non-usage of this subnet might be more a function of command
emphasis and priorities on SORM development, than a
reflection on ZOG.
2. Evaluation of the VINSON/ZOG Project
Three areas were initially selected for ZOG'
s
implementation on board U.S.S. CARL VINSON. These included
the SORM, administrative planning and evaluation
(management), and weapons elevator maintenance training.
Later, an expert system called AIRPLAN was added along with
several ad hoc applications. Each of these application areas
would suffer common problems endemic to either ZOG or the
Perqs. These problems include the following:
a. "Difficulty in using the ZED editor" [Ref. 14]. The
editor has proven awkward and hard to use. Once
mastered, it requires constant use to maintain
proficiency.
b. "ZOG is biased too much toward a breadth-first view"
[Ref. 15]. This is unnatural in relation to the
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normal way one is taught to think and read. An
analogy of this problem can be illustrated in reading
a book. When reading a book, one is taught to read
the first sentence on the first page, the second
sentence on the first page, etc., until the first
page has been read. The reader will then progress
through the second page, third page and so fourth
reading in this top to bottom manner. This is reading
depth first. If one were to instead read the first
sentence on page one of chapter one, the first
sentence on page one of chapter two etc., until he
progressed through the complete book, then return to
the beginning and do the same for the second
sentence, this would be breadth first. This type of
thought process is what is asked of the user in
reading ZOG subnets,
c. Hardware/Software problems. During the U.S.S. CARL
VINSON'S 1983 cruise, problems were continually
experienced with the Perq minicomputers. These
problems were partly due to the equipment being
ill-designed for a shipboard environment, and partly
due to equipment being installed without the benefit
of shock absorbers to compensate for pitch and roll
of the ship, or basic voltage protection to ensure
clean power, e.g. isolation transformers, line
regulators, line conditioners, uninterruptible power
supply, etc. Consequently the Perqs and Ethernet
experienced continual problems with electronic boards
and other electrical components.
ZOG itself was a major source of frustration to
members of the management department. Its personnel were
expending an inordinate amount of time in debugging the
system, indicating poor quality control of ZOG software
received from Mellon Institute. This lack of quality control
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was probably a direct result of transferring ZOG technology
from the research environment to an operational environment
too early in its development cycle. To exacerbate the
problem even further, management personnel on board the
U.S.S. CARL VINSON were attempting to integrate code being
written at both the Mellon Institute development site and
shipboard operational site. This difficult task was
attempted under an inflexible set of time constraints with
poor communication between the two sites. When the ship was
at sea, it could take up to a month for a mail query to be
answered.
a. The SORM
Nicholas Van Matre, Melvyn Moy and Patrick
McCann concluded in their evaluation of ZOG that "The SORM
was not suitable as an organizing element for all functional
applications as was originally conceived" [Ref. 16]. They
further found that there was a disproportionate usage of
SORM subnets, i.e. some portions were meticulously developed
and were providing extremely useful management support,
while other portions of the SORM subnet remained nothing but
shell.
The rational for this phenomenon was two- fold:
1. "Time was a limiting factor" [Ref. 17]. By this,
they mean that Perq/ZOG development was performed by
shipboard users collaterally with their primary
responsibilities. These users had to develop SORM
subnets in their own time after fulfilling their
foremost shipboard duties. This is closely related to
command emphasis, which was previously discussed.
2. The users had difficulty in "instantiating their job
as a subnet" [Ref. 18]. The user who was an expert
on the business side of the SORM, also had to perform
the technical function of fitting and copying his
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job into the ZOG database. This is a skill that
requires some expertise in choosing meaningful levels
of division and a good working knowledge of ZED
[Ref. 19]. Without this skill, and with limited or
non-recent training in this area, many users became
extremely frustrated.
Besides the above, hardware and software
problems had a discernible effect on SORM development. The
management department on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON had
completed installing the ZOG shell for SORM subnets before
the ship's initial cruise in 1983. Because of the size of
these SORM subnets (over 10,000 frames), the SORM database
was distributed over four host Perq minicomputers. Four
other Perqs held read only secondary copies. The other
twenty Perqs had the capability of accessing this SORM
database through the Ethernet local area network. During the
cruise, ship personnel experienced problems with both the
Ethernet and the Perqs, which precluded reliable access to
the SORM database by all except the four host computers.
This in effect limited the number of locations and,
therefore, the number of people that could access the SORM
database at one time. To further frustrate the user, several
other Perq minicomputers ceased to function as the cruise
progressed. Fewer and fewer computers were available on
which to run ZOG, thus further impacting SORM development.
By the end of the cruise there were only nineteen
functioning Perqs.
The combination of these problems has served to
frustrate the user and inhibit online development of the
SORM.
b. Weapons Elevator Maintenance Training
A complex application attempted with ZOG was an
on-line technical manual for the ship's weapons elevators.
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This manual was to provide maintenance personnel of the
ship's weapons department with technical support in
repairing, maintaining, and operating the ship's weapons
elevators. Additionally, it was to serve as a training
device for all members of the G-3 division. The manual
itself was hosted on three Perq minicomputers that were
connected to a laser video-disk player and CRT display
monitor.
During ship construction in Newport News,
Virginia, members of the weapons department G-3 division
made detailed, multiple- view video tapes of each step in
assembly and installation of the weapons elevators. On
completion, more color video tapes were made showing the
elevators in operation with appropriate motion and sound.
These video tapes were then moved to laser video disks.
Consequently, a complete pictorial history was made of each
weapons elevator aboard U.S.S. CARL VINSON.
Once developed, the user of this system would
read the on-line narrative portion of the technical manual,
and then look at the picture display. Like the SORM, all
material was categorized into three functional ZOG trees.
1. UNDERSTAND: This section breaks the elevator into
components, and describes their location and
function. While this section was easy to comprehend,
it was very difficult to actually construct a tree.
2. OPERATE: This is a combination description and
demonstration of elevator operation.
3. EVALUATE/MAINTAIN: This provides the technicians with
preventive maintenance procedures, specification and
electrical schematics.
While the on-line elevator maintenance manual
proved an excellent use of the new ZOG technology, it was
plagued with both software and hardware problems. The Perq
computers suffered electronic circuit board problems due to
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power fluctuations, while the laser video disk player
experienced alignment problems due to the motion and
vibration inherent on board ship. In the software arena, a
great deal of effort was expended in continually debugging
due to problems between the operating system and ZOG. One
other area in which the weapons elevator program proved
deficient was video disk expansion capability. It proved too
expensive to add to the current disk or make more disks.
Hence, before completion of the on-line technical manual,
the video disk literally ran out of space, resulting in
later additions to the technical manual being narrative only
[Ref. 20].
c. AIRPLAN
AIRPLAN is an "expert" system that was developed
as an aid and tool for the air operations officer in
monitoring and controlling carrier aircraft. It is not a
part of ZOG, but uses ZOG as an interface system between
itself and the user.
The AIRPLAN program is a rule-based, decision
support system that maintains a summary status on all
aircraft operationally controlled by the U.S.S. CARL VINSON,
and recommends actions to be taken as different situations
arise, e.g. emergency procedures. It is also capable of
modeling aircraft scenarios without requiring actual
aircraft launch.
Before flight operations, daily flight schedules
and initial status of all aircraft are loaded into the
AIRPLAN net. This includes such information as mission,
pilot name, primary and secondary buttons (communication
frequencies ) , and initial fuel and ordinance loads for each
aircraft. These inputs are loaded using SLED and are
automatically checked for errors. Output includes a hardcopy
flight schedule, ordnance loading plan and an emergency
24
landing plan. Once airborne, each aircraft is monitored and
its real time status is summarily displayed on a Perq
minicomputer. Included in this display is the amount of
remaining fuel in pounds and time remaining before certain
critical decisions must be made, i.e. land, refuel from an
air tanker, etc. The AIRPLAN net is also comprised of
emergency subnets for each aircraft which display a
procedural check-off list for different types of
emergencies
.
On a success/failure continuum, AIRPLAN has
proven to lie toward success for two reasons.
1. It is an alternative to the slower, manpower
intensive, manual systems that are used on all other
aircraft carriers.
2. AIRPLAN displays can be channeled to the ship's
secure closed circuit television system, as well as
the Perqs. This allows monitoring of air operations
from many compartments aboard ship including all
squadron ready rooms, the bridge, lower and hanger
deck control.
Although AIRPLAN is popular among personnel
concerned with flight operations it cannot be relied on in
an emergency, because it suffers from the same hardware and
software reliability problems that afflict the SORM and
Weapons elevator programs.
d. Planning and Evaluation Subnets
Planning and Evaluation (P and E) subnets
complete the triad of original ZOG applications first
envisioned for implementation on board U.S.S. CARL VINSON.
These subnets were intended to support both SPECIFIC PLANS
(one-time activities), and GENERIC PLANS (iterative
activities) at the department head level and above. Newell,
McCracken, Robertson and Akscyn described this on-line
planning as follows:
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"Plans will exist in an integrated ZOGnet, which will be
updated and modified continually as each plan is
extended and changed. Exploration of plans from
different perspectives will be possible, e.g. by task,
by persons or by resources. Some automatic monitoring of
plans for consistency and critical events, and some
propagation of status through plans will be possible."
tRef. 21]
Within each of these subnets, two basic types of
ZOG developed plans can be displayed. These are Specific
Responsibility Task Nets and Specific Responsibility Time
Line Nets. The Task Nets show the hierarchical relationship
of the tasks to be performed, i.e. it breaks them down into
components and subcomponents, but not in the chronological
order for completion. It also indicates the person or group
responsible for accomplishing the task, the required date of
completion, and the expected amount of time to complete the
task. The Time Line Nets exhibit time relationships between
the tasks. These tasks could be sorted by starting date,
completion date, and over time periods varying between one
day and eighteen months. By making a selection from the Time
Line Net, the related task frame of the Task Net along with
its detailed information will also be displayed. A hardcopy
of these timeline charts could be printed if desired. The
format of these plans is generally that of a standard Gantt
chart.
With the installation of ZOG on board U.S.S.
CARL VINSON, many formally structured P and E subnets were
established for ship's departments and personnel. See table
I for assigned machines and locations.
Although these planning and evaluation subnets
suffered from the same hardware and software problems as did
the SORM, they appear to have been used much more
extensively. During the U.S.S. CARL VINSON'S 1983 cruise,
108 subnets were created besides the formal ones enumerated
above. Of these subnets, 95 can be classified as primarily
supporting planning. [Ref. 22]
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TABLE I
Assigned Subnets and Machine Locations
ASSIGNED TASK SUBNETS MACHINE LOCATION
Air Officer (AOPS TASK) Air Ops office
Aviation intermediate
Maintenance Department (IMDO TASK) AIMD Office
Management Department (MGTO TASK) Conference room
Engineering Department (ENGO TASK) Engineers logroom
Medical Department (HMED TASK) Medical office
Navigation Department (NAVO TASK) Ship' s bridge
Operations department (OPSO TASK) Ops office
Personnel Department (PERS TASK) PERS office
Reactor Department (REAC TASK) REAC office
Strike OPS Department (OXOE TASK) Strike OPs Office
Supply Department (SUPO TASK) Supply office
Senior Chaplain Chaplain's office
Weapons Department (WEPS TASK) Weapons office
Executive Officer (YYXO TASK) XO' s office
Van Matre, Moy, and McCann attribute this
proliferation of activity in creating subnets midway through
the cruise to two factors.
1. The users had gained two months additional experience





ZOG became easier to use because an update to the
software "enabled a user to be presented with his own
unique 'top frame when first logging on,
instead of the ZOG data base top frame"
[Ref. 231.
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While these two factors undoubtedly contributed to expansion
of P and E subnets, the cruise itself was probably the
primary reason for this noted increase. Personnel who
actually developed and used these subnets were on board the
ship 24 hours a day with no interruption from land-line
telephones or ship visitors. This translates into increased
manhour availability for creating these subnets. The cycle
of the cruise is also partly responsible for the development
of these planning nets. When a ship first gets underway for
a major cruise, its operational tempo is one of training and
operational commitments. Its near term planning consist
primarily of fulfilling these commitments. About halfway
through a cruise, the ship will shift its planning emphasis
from an almost pure operational mode, to one that will
prepare it for the myriad of inspections, training
requirements, maintenance, and other demands that will
inundate it on its return to the United States. It is a
combination of all these factors taken together that
impacted on the proliferation of P and E subnets during
U.S.S. CARL VINSON'S first world cruise.
One specific task that consistently used one of
these planning subnets was the development of U.S.S. CARL
VINSON Greensheets. These are "plans of the day" (daily
plans) that are universally used on all U.S. Navy ships.
They list deviations from the daily routine of shipboard
life, i.e. changes in meal hours, meetings and scheduled
events along with times and personnel concerned. Onboard
U.S.S. CARL VINSON, the department heads would give the
Assistant Operations Strike Officer the information to be
included in the daily Greensheets. It took him about two
hours to prepare them after receiving the last input. This
is about the same time it takes to prepare the plan of the
day on other Navy ships. The main difference between these
Greensheets and another ship's plan of the day is that the
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Greensheets actually included a two day plan to allow for
better planning, and could be electronically disseminated
almost immediately to the Perqs. Hardcopy Greensheets still
had to be run off and delivered newspaper style to the vast
majority of the crew.
Another area where planning subnets were used
frequently was in getting the ship underway. To get a ship
underway requires a great deal of planning and coordination.
Tugs must be scheduled, charts corrected, engineering
equipment tested and brought on-line, food and supplies
brought on board, etc. Preparations will usually start days
and sometime weeks before actually taking in the lines and
getting the ship underway. A ZOG planning and evaluation
subnet was used on the U.S.S. CARL VINSON to provide an
online and hardcopy checkoff list to ensure that all
required tasks were completed at the proper time and in the
order they were scheduled. By keeping this information
on-line, an up-to-date date tailored plan could be
automatically created, and task relevant information
displayed for either a specific person or billet (specific
assigned shipboard job). The status of overall underway
preparations was also available for concerned personnel.
A third area where this type of subnet proved
useful was in preparing for the ORSE (Operational Readiness
System Evaluation). This is an involved inspection of the
engineering department on board a nuclear vessel. Both the
engineer and reactor officers used planning and management
nets to assimilate and correlate information concerning
personnel availability, training, checkoff list, schedules,
etc .
It appears that planning and evaluation subnets
were used extensively on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON
despite hardware and software problems. One possible reason
for this is that the only alternative solution was often
manual mode.
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E. A CRITIQUE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
If the sole objective of the 20G technology transfer
concept was to expedite the transition of technology from
the research laboratory of Carnegie-Mellon to the
operational environment of the U.S.S. CARL VINSON, then it
is an unqualified success. Success, however, is a nebulous
term that varies with time and the perspective from which
the system is being judged. For the U.S.S. CARL VINSON, it
hinges more on the future prospects of ZOG and its progeny
than its past. This is as it should be, because the Perq/ZOG
system as implemented on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON has
been fraught with problems. The reason for this is
four-fold.
1. ZOG was originally designed to run on the SPICE
operating system. Two months prior to the ship's 1983
cruise this operating system was deemed
inappropriate and its planned implementation on board
the U.S.S. CARL VINSON canceled. The standard Perq
operating system was designated to take its place.
2. ZOG, when first implemented in an operational
environment was a first generation system
undergoing constant development at a rapid pace. In
July of 1983, version 19.1 was being used on board
U.S.S. CARL VINSON. By October of 1983, the ship had
installed version 23.1. Each version represented a
major improvement over its predecessor, representing
everything from implementation of an electronic mail
system to installation of the new personalized ZOG
frame previously mentioned.
3. ZOG had been installed too fast. As a direct result
of the rapidity of ZOG's implementation, many
problems occurred that could have been minimized or
prevented. One example of this is in the area of
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hardware. Both the Perq minicomputers and Ethernet
system experienced a great deal of problems with
electronic components as a result of voltage
fluctuations. These problems were a direct result of
utilizing ship's power without the benefit of voltage
protection devices. When surge suppressors (voltage
line filters) were finally installed three months
into the cruise, electronic fault problems decreased
[Ref. 24]. While voltage spikes can increase fail
time on electronic equipment, a major power surge
will really wreak havoc on computer electronics. In
starting a large induction motor for example, a
tremendous amount of current draw will be
experienced; a 300 AMP electric motor will initially
draw approximately 1500 amps of current. On some
ships, depending on the power source, this can result
in severe damage to any computer or other electronic
equipment that is not protected with something more
than a simple surge protector.
4. A fourth reason the Perq/ZOG system appeared to have
so many problems is simply because the users gave the
system a good workout. If the system had not been
relentlessly used, then many of these problems could
have gone unnoticed.
1 . Disadvantages of ZOG
ZOG exhibits many disadvantages as it is presently
installed on board U.S.S. CARL VINSON. These include the
following:
a. "ZOG sacrifices efficiency of particular applications
to get integration" [Ref. 25]. ZOG makes many
compromises because it is attempting to be all things
to all types of users. This results in high
processing time and memory overhead within the
computer itself.
31
b. "ZOG doesn't support a fast database query language"
[Ref. 26]. To achieve flexibility and portability of
the database ZOG data is stored in mass storage as
text files. This requires a great deal of computer
overhead when parsing and unparsing ZOG frames.
c. ZOG is "Biased too much toward a breadth-first view"
[Ref. 27]. This was discussed in an earlier part of
this chapter.
d. "ZOG cannot be used over standard telecommunication
lines." [Ref. 28] A 1200 baud transmission rate is
too slow for using ZOG. It should be more than 9600
baud to obtain the full benefit of this type of
database
.
e. ZOG experiences decreasing speed as the database
grows. The U.S.S. CARL VINSON experienced a response
time of .5 seconds when accessing data that was
resident on the machine being used. If the data had
to be brought in from a part of the database resident
on another machine, then access time was increased to
1.5 seconds when both machines were running normally.
[Ref. 29] The original design goal for ZOG was near
.25 seconds, and was regularly reached in the
laboratory. As database use and size increase, speed
can expect to decrease even more.
2 . Advantages of ZOG
Strictly from a user's viewpoint, a ZOG type system
has several advantages over a more conventional mainframe
architecture, or even a network of mini/microcomputers that
use non-database type software. Some of these advantages are
as follows:
a. Redundancy of hardware. Those who have experienced
shipboard life quickly realize that equipment wears
faster, breaks quicker, and has a shorter life span
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than equivalent equipment that is used in a less
hostile environment. This is especially true of
computer equipment. It must be designed to contend
with high humidity/ temperature variances, salt air
corrosion, power fluctuations, and structural
movement of the ship itself. Even then, all other
things being equal, shipboard installed equipment
will still have a shorter life expectancy and greater
failure rate than equivalent equipment ashore. A
redundant hardware architecture, such as the Perq
system, means that the entire system will not come to
a crashing halt as a result of the loss of one, two
or even more computers.
Redundancy of data. This principle carries over into
the software area as well. By using a distributed
database the loss of one or more nodes does not bring
the whole system to a screeching halt.
Ease of use. This is especially important in a
shipboard environment where high rates of personnel
turnover often occur. A computer novice can be taught
to navigate through ZOG in less than thirty minutes.
In two hours he can be taught to add new material to
the database with ZED. [Ref. 30]
Browsing capability. Closely tied to ease of use is
browsing capability. Instead of having to search the
database using query methods, the new user can jump
right in and start exploring the database through
random browsing. This capability in effect functions
as a tutor allowing the new user to explore the
database and familiarize himself with how it is set
up. The ZOG system defaults to the browsing mode when
it is entered.
Large database. A fifth advantage of ZOG is that it
supports a large database, e
.
g . the U.S.S. CARL VINSON
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had over 30,000 frames. Theoretically, the only limit
on size is mass memory of the hardware device, and
possibly some operating system constraints.
f. Allows more information to be produced from a given
amount of data. In effect, a database allows a piece
of data to be entered once and used by everyone,
instead of everyone entering that same piece of data
in a personalized file. Thus, one piece of data is
supplying more information to more people. This is
especially important on board ship. For example, if a
supply officer were to keep his complete requisition
status (status of items on order) in a database, the
engineer, operations officer, or other interested
personnel could obtain the latest information simply
by addressing the database. This would free up the
supply officer and his men for more constructive
tasks, as well as keeping appropriate personnel
apprised of their requisition status. The checkoff
sheet for getting the ship underway is a working
example of this concept. Assignment of task and
times which will result in the completion of required
activities needed to get the ship underway are loaded
into the ZOG database. This information is then used
by anyone on the ship with access to a Perq who has
need of this data.
g. Elimination of data duplication. By using a database
system, many artificial partitions used to separate
data in a conventional file system are eliminated.
This allows a specific piece of data to be entered
once, yet used over and over by many different
programs. Consequently, the number of times that a
specific piece of data is entered into the database
is reduced, while at the same time the amount of
information that can be derived from that particular
piece of data is increased.
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Additional advantages derived from ZOG's distributed
database include data integrity, data independence from
embedded programs or agents, and the capability for better
data management.
F. CONCLUSIONS
ZOG appears to be much more flexible in areas which can
use the system primarily as an interface for embedded
programs or other technology such as AIRPLAN and the weapons
elevator technical manual. It is inflexible in areas where
it must function as an organizing element, i.e. used as the
primary tool for creating and arranging difficult structural
documentation, such as the SORM. While it can be made to
support planning and evaluation subnets, much of this
support is really done with the brute force method. Most of
the planning functions could be done more efficiently by use
of a standard turnkey system with an electronic mail
capability. Technology transfer does offer more reliability
than the other systems presently on U.S.S. CARL VINSON
primarily because of its distribution features. It is less
prone to total failure due to fire, water or other
catastrophe than is a centralized system.
With the influx of new personnel, ZOG usage will
probably go down. This is because many of the new people,
while just as dedicated as the older personnel, will not
have benefited by such a close association with the
developers as did the original personnel. They will also
have more systems to chose from.
While this will probably mean that ZOG is used on a less
frequent basis, it should not be abandon. Instead, it should






Some of the more common computing equipment found on
board Naval ships and installations in recent years has been
manufactured by WANG Laboratories Inc. (WANG). This
phenomenon is a direct result of WANG' s strategy of
marketing its products as "word processers" vice "data
processers", as most other vendors have done. While an
off-the-shelf WANG word-processing machine is configured
primarily to perform word processing functions, it can be
turned into a powerful data processor with just a few minor
adjustments and the installation of the appropriate
software. Nevertheless, up until 1982, WANG word-processing
products had been listed and procured under the GSA (General
Services Administration) contract schedule as office
equipment (federal supply class 74) instead of under the
more restrictive GSA contract schedule for automatic data
processing equipment (federal supply class 70). In 1982 the
Navy issued an instruction defining automatic data
processors and equipment by purpose instead of by class
[Ref. 31]. With the issuance of this instruction Navy
commands could no longer purchase a WANG word processor and
convert it into a data processing machine without having to
go through the extensive and complicated acquisition
procedures required for procuring automated data processing
equipment
.
While the majority of WANG processers on board naval
vessels are used strictly for word processing, there are six
noted exceptions. Five of these exceptions are the WANG
VS-80 prototype SNAP II systems installed on board the
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U.S.S. David R. Ray, U.S.S. Kidd, U.S.S. Scott, U.S.S.
Chandler, and the U.S.S. Callaghan. The U.S.S. Fife and the
U.S.S. New Jersey were originally outfitted with these WANG
VS-80 prototypes as well, but have since had them replaced
with the Harris SNAP II system. The WANG systems originally
installed on the U.S.S. Fife and the U.S.S. David R. Ray
were implemented as SNAP II prototypes by the Commander
Naval Ships Engineering System Command (COMNAVSEASYSCOM)
,
while those installed on the remaining five ships were
procured, implemented and designated as interim SNAP II
systems by Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific
(COMNAVSURFPAC) . This was done before the selection of the
Navy's standard SNAP II computer system to get non-tactical
automation capability on board each of these newly
commissioned ships. Software was jointly developed and
implemented by NAVSEA (PMS-389) and Navy Management Systems
Support Office (NAVMASSO) Norfolk. In July 1983 NAVMASSO
placed a moratorium on further software development for the
WANG VS-80 system. This was followed in August 1983 by
COMNAVSURFPAC making known his intentions to replace the
WANG prototype system with the standard Harris SNAP II as
they become available. [Ref. 32]
The other installation which uses a WANG system for more
than simple word processing is on board the U.S.S. CARL
VINSON. It is this system that will be the focus of this
chapter
.
B. WANG AND THE U.S.S. CARL VINSON
In June 1980, a WANG System-20 computer was leased and
installed in a naval office building being used by the
precommissioning crew of the Navy's aircraft carrier, U.S.S.
Carl Vinson, then under construction at the Newport News
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in Newport News, Virginia.
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It consisted of a single terminal, a floppy disk drive, and
one printer. The system-20 ran what is called "Glossary
Language" besides standard COBAL.
Glossary language is a key word oriented language that
can be used for calling a library of routines, utilities, or
series of keystrokes. It is an integral part of the word
processing package available on the System-20. While using
this language is analogous to programming a PF key on an IBM
System, it will do much more. For example, the glossary
function can be programmed to format standard documentation
such as a form-letter. When activated, it will print
required information like a letter head, place in an
automatic return and jump down to the address area. The user
will input the name and address of the intended recipient
and hit the return key. At that time the glossary language
will print out the remainder of the letter.
The primary purpose for obtaining the System-20 was to
enumerate and track the thousands of tasks requiring
completion before the ship could be commissioned. This
planning and control function was to be the precursor of the
planning and evaluation subnets that would later be
developed and used on the Perq/ZOG system.
Once installed, the System-20 proved to be extremely
useful. As a result, Captain Richard Martin, the
prospective commanding officer of the U.S.S. CARL VINSON,
decided to expand its users to include the ship's department
heads. By March, it had become apparent that the system was
too small to perform all the functions and tasks now
required of it. Consequently, in April 1980 the System-20
was traded in for a System-30 that was also leased from
WANG. The System-30 was configured with 10 terminals, 3
printers, and a 30-MB (megabyte) hard disk drive.
Shortly after the WANG System-30 was installed, it
became apparent that computing demands for both the
38
precommissioning planning and control requirements and the
department heads had been greatly underestimated. With the
inclusion of department heads in the coterie of WANG users,
the proverbial door had been opened for personnel within the
various departments themselves to access the system. Once
this occurred, contagion for the WANG System-30 began to run
rampant throughout the ship. Personnel from the
administrative, medical, engineering, personnel and other
departments began to find new and innovative ways to use the
WANG to make their own work more efficient and effective. As
a direct result, a WANG VS-80 system was leased in July 1980
to upgrade the System-30. The System-30 was retained on
board the ship for use by the engineering department until
September 1983, when its lease ran out and it was returned
to WANG. The VS-80 leased from WANG increased the size of
the hard disk drive from 30-mb to 90-mb of storage. To
ensure that enough memory was available, an additional 75-mb
was procured and added to the VS- 80 specifically to upgrade
the planning and control functions.
Although the VS-80 system with additional memory was
adequate for the needs of the U.S.S CARL VINSON'S
precommissioning crew, it again proved too small once the
ship was commissioned and became an operating unit of the
U.S. Navy. Captain Martin then decided the ship should
obtain the largest processor system made by WANG, a super
mini computer called the VS-100. This would meet the ship's
present needs while allowing for future expansion. In July
1981, the VS-80 system was returned to WANG in exchange for
a leased VS-100 system. The VS-100 was configured with a
spider network of 28 smart terminals directly wired into the
mainframe, two 288-mb disk drives, one magnetic tape drive,
one telecommunications channel, and a 2-mb main memory. By
October 1984, the WANG VS-100 System was purchased outright
by the ship and upgraded to include 86 terminals, 21
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printers, 4 disk drives, 11 telecommunications channels,
8-MB of main memory, and a prototype WANG Net.
C. A SECOND WANG VS-80 SYSTEM
In January of 1982 the management department of the
U.S.S. CARL VINSON obtained a second WANG VS-80 System,
which had originally been procured by the U.S.S. Lexington
(AVT-16). While on board the U.S.S. Lexington, the 110 Volt
Alternating Current (VAC) VS-80 System had inadvertently
been connected to a 220 VAC power source, which resulted in
damage to a majority of the internal electrical and
electronic components. Once in the possession of the U.S.S.
CARL VINSON'S management department, repair parts were
procured from WANG. Within six months, technicians on board
the U.S.S. CARL VINSON had made the system fully
operational
.
This particular system was installed in the ship's
Combat Information Center (CIC) . It is configured with one
288-MB disk drive, a printer, and five smart terminals
connected to the CPU in a spider network. Neither the VS-80
System nor any of its five workstations have external
communication capabilities outside the tempest certified
space. The system is being used to handle highly classified
intelligence information.
D. WANG NET
In 1983, the U.S.S. CARL VINSON was selected as a
beta-test site for a prototype WANG Net. The WANG Net
implemented on the ship actually consisted of two separate
nets (one upper, one lower) of the dual cable, broadband,
active headend type design. This means the equipment uses
two cables to connect into the main trunk line. One cable is
used for transmission and one cable is used for reception,
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thus eliminating the need for two different frequencies. The
upper net serves all terminals located above the hanger
deck, while the lower net serves all terminals located below
the hanger deck. It is this lower loop that presented an
interesting engineering problem that required three
iterations of installation before the net became fully
operational
.
The main deck on board a ship is called the "damage
control deck" . All compartments located below the damage
control deck must maintain watertight integrity, which means
that no new penetrations or openings can be made in
bulkheads (walls), overheads (ceilings), or decks (floors).
Provisions are made during the construction of a naval ship
to provide a path for cables and wires to pass through these
inviolate partitions. These paths are then sealed with a
pliant material to maintain the compartment's watertight
integrity. This close grouping of different types of cables
can present problems. High voltage lines, telephone wires,
and computer cables are all joined together and run through
compartments and partitions as a single group in what is
called a cablerun. These cableruns are often routed near
light fixtures, generators, and other sources of
electromagnetic interference. It was these cableruns which
proved troublesome in the initial attempt to install the
WANG Net. The first attempt to implement the system used
unshielded RG-11 coaxial cable which simply did not work.
CATV-type amplifiers installed at intervals along the net
were also insufficient to keep signal attenuation less than
40 DB
.
As a result, a second attempt was made using single
shielded RG-11 cable and a special amplifier designed to
keep signal loss to less than 40 DB . While this mitigated
the problem somewhat, it still required a third attempt
before the system was fully operational. On this last
attempt RG-11 double shielded cable was installed along with
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some minor adjustments to the special amplifiers, before the
system became operational.
The current configuration of the WANG Net uses a
branching- tree topology to connect the processing equipment
to the two single trunk lines that run throughout the ship.
Several amplifiers and netmuxs (network multiplexers) are
attached to the network cable at different points. A netmux
is simply a device which permits the simultaneous
transmission of many independent channels into a single
high-speed data stream by dividing the signal from different
device channels ( terminals) into successive alternate bits.
In a nutshell, a netmux can be compared to a black-box that
takes input data supplied by anywhere from 1 to 8 terminals
and outputs it to the main trunk line of the WANG Net, or
vice versa. By using a network system such as this,
terminals and personal computers can be easily attached to
the mainframe without the necessity of stringing a new cable
each time. This results in smaller cableruns and better
watertight integrity between adjoining compartments, because
fewer cables penetrate common watertight bulkheads. It also
permits the WANG VS-100 system to run more than the 96
workstations it would have been limited to had it operated
with only the spider configuration. For each netmux
installed in the WANG Net an additional 8 workstations can
be added to the system. While there is no limit to the
number of netmuxs that can be installed, the present
operating system (VS-OS, revision 6.2) on the WANG VS-100
restricts the system to a total of 128 terminal nodes.
E. ESSENCE OF WANG
Except for the WANG Net, the Wang VS-100 system as
presently configured on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON is the
same system being used in numerous commercial and industrial
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applications. The essence of this system is its ability to
perform diverse tasks of both a general and specific nature.
It can be used to perform data processing, word processing,
and electronic mail, yet still be adapted to specialized
use. An example of this specialized use on board the U.S.S.
CARL VINSON is the WANG's backup function as the ship's
message processing distribution system (MPDS). The MPDS is
a system unique to Nimitz class aircraft carriers and
communication, command, and control ships ( LCC ' s ) . It is a
system that takes a message received in the ship's
communication center, reads the standard subject
identification code embedded in the header of each message,
and routes it to the action officer or department that has
cognizance over that particular subject area. For example,
if the subject concerns fuel for the ship's emergency diesel
generation system, the engineering department would
automatically be routed a copy as the message arrives on the
ship. What distinguishes this system from similar procedures
on other ships is that MPDS is done electronically without
human intervention. MPDS actually consist of a small
processor in the communications center that is linked to
several hardcopy terminals dispersed to various functional
areas throughout the ship, i.e. engineering, supply,
operations, etc. Although MPDS fully automates the
communications center on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON, a
separate paper tape punch creates a record tape of each
message transaction. If the MPDS were to fail, the
information on these paper tapes could be uploaded to the
WANG VS-100 with an attached paper tape punch and
distributed to the appropriate departments and personnel
through the WANG terminals. Messages can also be composed on
the WANG VS-100 and output on a paper tape. This paper tape
can then be taken to the ship's communication center and
transmitted with regular teletype communications equipment.
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The WANG VS-100 is, therefore, a complete backup system to
MPDS.
1. The User and the WANG VS-100
A majority of present and former personnel of the
U.S.S. CARL VINSON interviewed about the ship's WANG
installation consider the VS-100 to be user friendly. This
particular system is completely menu driven and appears to
be easy to use. One reason for this is because it is a
commercial system that was designed to be used by a
multitude of different users. A shipboard technician summed





Evaluation of WANG on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON
The WANG VS-100 capabilities that are used the most
on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON are the word-processing
package and the electronic mail feature. One member of the
ship°s management department estimated that 90% of all jobs
performed on the WANG VS-100 involve interactive
word-processing, while only 10% involve data processing.
This is in consonance with one of the two original reasons
for procuring the VS-100 in the first place, i.e. to provide
the ship with a powerful, versatile word processing
capability. The other reason, which was discussed briefly in
an earlier part of this chapter, was to aid in the area of
planning and control.
Although the WANG VS-100 is a centralized unit, it
has proven much more reliable than the Perq distributed
System discussed in Chapter Three. There are four primary
reasons for this phenomenon:
a. The WANG VS-100 is a rugged machine. It is designed
to operate between 196 vac (volts alternating
current) and 253 vac without sustaining electronic
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damage. Additionally, a dedicated w/30a circuit
breaker is installed with all WANG VS-100
installations to shut the system down in case of
electrical overload. [Ref. 33]
Members of the management department ensured that an
isolation transformer was properly installed on the
ship's power outlets that supplied the WANG VS-100.
Although the rational for an isolation transformer on
board ship is really for electrical safety and
electrical ground isolation, it has an added
capability of attenuateing electrical noise in
electronic equipment. In addition, the ship's force
installed a low voltage protection device to shut
down the system if voltage dropped too low. This
prevents the system from voltage surge if power is
suddenly restored after a loss of the electrical
load.
A third reason the WANG VS-100 proved so much more
reliable than the Perq System is because it is
enclosed within its own air conditioned space. While
most of the Perq's were also located in air
conditioned spaces, their spaces were more likely to
be kept at a temperature and humidity conducive to
human comfort than that for optimum machine
performance
.
The final reason the WANG fared so much better than
the Perqs was because the WANG mainframe was located
in a limited access area where it was constantly
monitored by trained technical personnel. If an
abnormal situation began to develop, it could be
quickly detected and appropriate corrective action
taken. With the Perq System, the computers were
distributed throughout the ship where abnormalities
were more likely to occur and less likely to be
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detected by qualified technical personnel. This
situation ultimately resulted in more equipment
casualties to the Perqs.
Before October 1984, the ship had experienced only
one significant problem with the WANG VS-100. A clock
circuit had failed, which in turn caused a cache memory
problem. Ship's technicians corrected this problem within
two hours of its occurrence. The Perq computers on the other
hand had suffered numerous equipment problems throughout
this same time period.
a. Electronic Mail and Word Processing
The combination of electronic mail and word
processing on the WANG VS-100 have served to reduce the
ship's administrative work-load considerably. One particular
area in which this is evident is in the preparation of
personnel evaluations. Onboard most Navy ships, a chief
petty officer would make the first handwritten draft of an
enlisted person's evaluation. He would then submit it to his
division officer who would either send it back to the chief
for revision, or submit it to his department head. The
department head would then review the evaluation and either
send it back to the division officer for further revision or
submit it to the executive officer for final review and
signature approval. At any point in this process, changes
can be made before it is submitted to the next person in the
chain of command, or it can be sent back down the chain for
partial or total revision. It is not unheard of for an
evaluation to traverse through this procedure two or three
times before it is finally approved and signed. After one
iteration of this traversal the evaluation oftentimes must
be completely rewritten or retyped. Officer's fitness
reports follow a similar procedure except they are initiated
by the next senior officer in the chain of command and
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signed by the commanding officer. Some personnel are
required to have evaluations submitted on them every six
months, while everyone receives at least one a year and two
if they are being transferred off the ship. Multiply this
simple evaluation process to include the thousands of
personnel that make up the crew of the U.S.S. CARL VINSON
and the task quickly becomes non-trivial. Envision this
task being performed on paper and it becomes overwhelming.
With the WANG VS-100 this same evaluation process is greatly
simplified. The chief petty officer can type in the twenty
or thirty evaluations he is required to initiate into the
WANG System and send them electronically to his division
officer. The division officer will add his comments to those
evaluations he feels are correct and forward them
electronically to his department head. Those that he rejects
are returned electronically to the same chief petty officer
who initiated them for revision and resubmission. This same
process is performed between the department head and the
executive officer, and between the executive officer and the
commanding officer for officer fitness reports. Once the
evaluation has received final approval from either the
Commanding Officer or the Executive Officer, the WANG will
perform a final spelling check, automatically format, and
print a hard copy.
Although this example concerns only the
shipboard evaluation process, the method of electronically
creating and routing all sorts of correspondence and reports
is used extensively on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON. One
particular area where it is used on a daily basis is in the
creation and release of Naval messages. The drafter will
initially create a Naval message using the word processing
capabilities of the WANG VS-100. These capabilities include
a spelling checker, standard fill in the blank type formats
for the most commonly sent messages, and a plain language
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address (PLAD) look-up program besides other standard word
processing features. The VS-100 will look up the correct
PLAD and insert it in the header of the message. Once this
is done, the message will be routed to the commanding
officer for his review and release. The Commanding Officer
can then review and release the message from the bridge, his
cabin, or any place on the ship where a WANG terminal is
located. This precludes his having to carry around a stack
of paper when dealing with routine messages, or having to be
chased down to get a release signature in the case of more
urgent ones, thereby saving uncountable numbers of manhours.
Once these messages are released by the Commanding Officer,
they are printed out on a paper tape and taken to the ship s
communication center for transmission. The combination of
electronic mail and word-processing has proven highly
successful on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON.
. b. Data Processing
The VS-100' s data processing capabilities are
not being fully used on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON. One
reason for this is because other non-tactical automated
systems are performing the majority of the ship's required
data processing tasks. As of October 1984, a Durango
Computer was being used for maintaining records and creating
reports in the food service management area, while the
Honeywell Snap I System was being used as an interface
between maintenance and supply functions, ordering parts,
printing paychecks, etc. This leaves very little data
processing actually being performed on the WANG VS-100.
There are some exceptions, however. One particular area on
board the ship in which the WANG ' s data processing
capabilities are being used is to create customized reports
of ship's personnel who are eligible to vote in different
states and elections. For example, If the voting officer
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needs to know how many members of the ship's engineering
department are eligible to vote in a special election in
Michigan, he can process this data on the WANG and create a
customized report enumerating this information. The voting
officer can then disseminate the needed information to the
appropriate personnel.
The career counselor is another person who uses
the data processing capabilities of the WANG VS-100. He is
responsible for maintaining a current list of regulations
and guidelines concerning reenlistment incentives, Navy
schools, and general career path information. The career
counselor will also maintain a master schedule of career
interviews, which can be disseminated to division officers
on a monthly or weekly basis. This is simply a list of
ship's personnel who are scheduled for division officer
reenlistment interviews. With the WANG VS-100, he is able to
maintain his data, process it, and create required reports
and interview schedules quickly and easy. For example, if
entrance requirements for a specific Navy school are
lowered, the career counselor can quickly produce a list of
ship's personnel who had previously expressed an interest in
that school, but until now had not met the entrance
requirements. He can then contact the individuals concerned
and ascertain if they are still interested in attending the
school
.
The ship's Damage Control Assistant (DCA)
officer also uses the data processing capabilities of the
WANG VS-100 to maintain the ship's master compartment check
off list (CCOL)
. Each compartment on the ship has a CCOL
posted in a conspicuous location near its access, which
lists and describes all fittings and systems within that
particular compartment. The CCOL also gives the damage
control classification, which tells when the fittings or
systems should be activated or secured, and indicates the
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ship's division that is responsible for their maintenance
and closure status. If a division needs to have a complete
list of all the deck drains it is responsible for
maintaining, the DCA can produce such a list from the master
using the data processing capabilities of the WANG. Using
the WANG's database, the DCA can also produce a customized
report of compartment material and equipment deficiencies
for each of the last four zone inspections. Zones are
nothing more than artificial divisions or groupings of
equipments and compartments to facilitate their inspection,
hence the term zone inspection.
Other areas that use the WANG VS-100 for data
processing include the medical and dental departments. The
medical department uses the system to identify personnel who
are due for shots and to monitor urinalysis testing for
drugs, while the dental department identifies personnel
requiring dental exams. While there is some data processing
being performed on the WANG VS-100, it is not enough to
justify the systems existence on that basis alone. Current
justification relies on the areas of word- processing and
electronic mail. It has been these two areas that have been
the driving force for increasing both the efficiency and
effectiveness of numerous administrative functions on board
the U.S.S. CARL VINSON.
c. Specific Applications
With the implementation of the WANG VS-100 on
board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON, an abundance of computing
power was suddenly made available to ship's personnel.
While most of the applications run on the WANG by these
shipboard users is of a general nature, many of them proved
to be quite innovative. One of the more novel uses of the
WANG VS-100 was developed by the ship's first Commanding
Officer, Captain Richard Martin, but is actually employed
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by the ship's embarked airwings. An airwing is a separate
organizational entity that is temporarily assigned to the
ship for an operational deployment or exercise. The airwing
is made up of different squadrons, which consist of the
pilots and support personnel required to operate and
maintain a group of like aircraft. These support personnel
include mechanics, plane-crews, and administrative
personnel. When an airwing is assigned to the ship for an
extended amount of time, it will move all its aircraft,
personnel, and records on board the ship. These records are
quite comprehensive. They include everything from the
complete maintenance history of each aircraft to the medical
and dental records of the airwing' s assigned personnel.
When assigned to the U.S.S. CARL VINSON, these records are
carried on board electronically filed in the airwings
portable WANG Professional Computer (PC), which they carry
with them. Each of these portable computers is configured
with two duel 5 1/4 inch floppy disk drives, a 10 megabyte
hard disk drive, 640-KB of random access memory, its own
operating system, and a serial printer. Once on board, the
WANG PCs are connected to the VS-100, and all its data is
uploaded to the mainframe. While attached to the U.S.S. CARL
VINSON, the airwing uses the capabilities of the WANG VS-100
to maintain files and meet its data processing requirements.
When the airwing is ready to depart, it downloads its data
to the WANG PC, and returns to its home base with the PC and
all it's files electronically recorded. This innovative use
of the ship's Vs-100 and a WANG PC has permitted the
different airwings to automate their own administrative
functions and quickly integrate them into those of the ship
when embarking.
Another application that has proven highly
successful on the WANG VS-100 is the ship's personnel
information system. This is an on-line database. unique to
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the U.S.S. CARL VINSON, that contains medical, dental, and
personnel records for both ship's officers and enlisted
crewmembers, as well as, other appropriate administrative
records. To ensure that only properly authorized personnel
can view information within this database, a Federated
Management System ( FMS ) interfaces with the computers
security program. The FMS assigns all users a special code.
This FMS code identifies the files and protection classes
(unprotected, execute-only, read-only or private file) that
can be accessed by that particular user. When a user first
logs on the WANG VS-100, he will enter his "user id" and
"personal password". From this information the FMS will
internally locate his FMS code and display a menu of data
files that he is allowed to access. Within the Personnel
Management System for example, only personnel authorized by
the medical department along with those having "system
administrative rights" are allowed to read medical records.
All members within the WANG division of the management
department have these "system administrative rights".
This system allows the personnel officer to
maintain a mini electronic personnel record for each member
of the ship's crew. In addition, the career counselor and
voting officer can use this database to create customized
reports as previously discussed, while the ship's division
officers can use it as an on-line division officers
notebook. A division officers notebook is nothing more than
a record kept on each man within a division. It usually
includes his name, present rate, educational level, Navy
schools attended, noted achievements, etc.
Additional application areas of a specified
nature performed on the WANG VS-100 include a messmen
information system to keep track of messcooks assigned to
the ship's messdecks, a management department utilities and
muster list, the public affairs officer's datafiles, the
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photographic departments equipment list and job order
information, and a list of navigational aids used by the
ship's navigator.
d. Unused Capabilities
Although the ship uses the VS-100's word
processing and electronic mail applications extensively and
its data-processing capacity to a limited degree, it is not
taking full advantage of the WANG-Net itself. As previously
discussed, the WANG-Net is of the dual cable active header
type. Being a broadband network it is capable of multiple
service analog transmission, i.e. it is capable of
transmitting data, voice, video, etc. vice strictly serial
digital signaling as in baseband nets.
This capability allows the WANG-Net to be used
in the following four ways:
1. It can be used to support either WANG PC's or
intelligent terminals as VS work stations. This is
the mode in which it is presently being used on board
the U.S.S. CARL VINSON. These workstations just
input data to the VS-100 and output it to a CRT
terminal
.
2. The WANG-Net has a remote telecommunications
interconnect band that allows it to function as a
telephone line between different nodes on the net.
Any protocol may be used as long as the WANG or
non-WANG terminal devices using this band have
industrial standard electrical interfaces, and the
protocols operate at the same speed.
3. A special WANG PC band is also included which
connects all stand-alone type WANG PC's into a
distributed network. The WANG VS-100 cannot be part
of this system, hence the distributed network will
still function if there is a casualty to the VS-100
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itself. This special band uses time division
multiplexing and operates at 2.5 million bits/second.
[Ref. 34]
4. The interconnect band allows Stand-alone PC's to talk
to each other at either 64,000 bits/sec, 9,600
bits/sec, 4800 bits/sec, 2400 bits/sec or 1200
bits/sec. This particular band can also be accessed
by small computers made by other vendors. [Ref. 35]
To use these capabilities more fully would
require replacement of all intelligent terminals presently
on the net with either WANG PC's equipped with appropriate
expansion cards, or other vendor equivalents with
appropriate protocols.
F. A CRITIQUE OF THE WANG VS-100 ONBOARD THE U.S.S. CARL
VINSON
Being a commercial system designed to accommodate a wide
spectrum of users, the WANG VS-100 installation suffers from
the same faults common to most systems attempting to be
everything to everyone. That is, it does a good job in all
its shipboard applications and a superior job in a few.
However, it may not be the best suited system for all the
applications presently being performed on board the ship. To
make a reasonable determination as to whether it is the best
suited system would require a thorough cost/benefit
analysis, which goes beyond the scope of this paper. To get
a better feel for the direction such an analysis would take
some advantages, disadvantages, and management issues will
be considered below.
1. Advantages of the WANG VS-100 Installation
The WANG VS-100 System on board the U.S.S. CARL
VINSON exhibits many advantages.
54
Versatile word processor. The word processor that is
installed on the ship's WANG VS-100 offers the user
several diverse capabilities. These include a choice
of fonts, a documentation shrinker, and even the
capability to print upside down if required.
User friendly. The management department on board the
U.S.S. CARL VINSON holds a full three-day training
session for new users once a month besides special
classes in basic and cobol programming when the ship
is on an extended deployment. The monthly training
session itself consists of an indoctrination to
computers along with specific tutorial exercises for
the WANG VS-100 and the word processing editor. It
has been the experience of some members of the
management department that a student can perform
basic applications on the VS-100 terminals after only
an hours instruction. The reason for this is because
the system is totally menu driven and therefore,
extremely easy to learn to use. The system also
employees a library of standard routines and utility
programs which make code generation a simple task for
the more sophisticated user.
Good response time. The WANG VS-100 is designed to be
an extremely fast machine. In addition to its
separate cache memory, the VS-100 uses a 64-bit data
bus between the main memory and other major processor
components, and a 32-bit central processor ( CP ) data
bus. The combination of these three factors results
in a rapid CPU cycle time (160
nanoseconds/micro-instruction)
. With up to 70 users
on the system there is virtually no noticeable change
in response time to the user. Of course, because the
majority of applications being run on the processor
concern word- processing vice data processing means
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that the CPU is idle quite a bit of the time. Thus,
the system usually runs near its fastest speed.
d. Equipment reliability. From the time the WANG VS-100
was installed on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON in July
1981 until the end of the ship's first cruise in the
fall of 1983, there was only one major equipment
failure despite the fact that most of the equipment
servicing was done on board by ship's technicians.
Since the end of that first cruise there have been no
significant equipment casualties reported for the
ship' s WANG VS-100.
e. Diverse selection of software readily available.
Being a commercial system, the VS-100 can support a
wide range of off- the-shelf software along with
several multiple high-level languages, including ANSI
COBOL, BASIC, FORTRAN, PL/1, and RPG II. In addition,
it supports a macro assembler that uses an
instruction set compatible with that used on an IBM
360, and an English-like command language called
"PROCEDURE", which allows the user to create special
text files that will perform many of the operations
normally executed interactivi ly . It is similar to job
control language. [Ref. 36]
2. Disadvantages of the U.S.S. CARL VINSON' s WANG
Installation
The WANG VS-100 System exhibits many disadvantages
as it is presently installed on board the U.S.S. CARL
VINSON. These include the following:
a. Lack of redundancy. Being a centralized system with a
single CPU, there is no backup if a major casualty
were to occur to the equipment. This could be
mitigated somewhat by replacing all the intelligent
terminals on the WANG Net with self contained
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personal computers configured with appropriate
expansion cards to activate the distributed
processing capacity of the WANG-Net as discussed
above
.
b. Requires a constant attendant 24 hours per day.
Unlike the Perqs and the Snap II computers being
implemented on smaller ships, the WANG VS-100
requires an operator to be on duty within the space
at all times. This attendant is required for security
as well as for equipment operation and monitoring.
c. Limited growth potential. The present system
architecture is set, limiting flexibility for future
growth to 128 terminals. While the present system
cannot be expanded beyond these 128 terminal nodes,
replacement of all intelligent terminals on the
WANG-Net with stand-alone PC's configured with the
appropriate expansion boards would increase the
amount ' of processing that could be done with the
present configuration. This would postpone if not
preclude having to go to a larger machine as new uses
for the VS-100 are developed.
d. Lack of an uninterruptible power supply (UPS).
e. Onboard a Naval vessel it is considered good
engineering practice to rotate ship's service turbo
generators (SSTG's) on a daily basis to ensure that
all mechanical systems wear at approximately the same
rate, as well as, to detect abnormal operating
conditions in any of the equipment. While this
shifting of generators is usually carried out in a
smooth, orderly procedure, it is not uncommon to lose
electrical power in all or parts of the ship. When
this occurs, all electronic equipment that does not
have an UPS must be secured to prevent internal
damage. The WANG VS-100 does not have a UPS which
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means that it will shut down in case of a power
interruption. This results in the loss of any data
then being input on the intelligent terminals,
unscheduled down-time, and a time consuming procedure
to reset the system and bring it back on-line.
f. Lost data if CPU shuts down. If the CPU should be
inadvertently shut down through a power loss or some
other mishap it loses the addresses of the terminals
that are inputing data at that time. This means that
all the data in the buffers of the intelligent
terminals cannot be recovered.
g. Reliance on one vendor. The WANG VS-100 system and
associated WANG Net as* implemented on the U.S.S. CARL
VINSON is a 100% WANG system. Since many commercial
devices and peripheral equipments are not compatible
with the VS-100, they must be purchased from WANG
vice competitive bidding. Hence, the ship is locked
into using WANG equipment with very few exceptions.
h. Lack of Navy parts support for the VS-100. Since the
WANG VS-100 is not a standard system throughout the
Navy, it is not supported by the Naval supply system.
This means that the ship is required to purchase and
carry numerous replacement parts and consumable items
on its own. The ship is presently carrying an
estimated one-time • expenditure of $475,000 in repair
parts and is expending $100,000 per year in
consumables to support the WANG VS-100.
3 . Management I ssues
In addition to those advantages and disadvantages
enumerated above, there are several issues that do not fit
clearly into either category. These are issues that should
be considered before the decision to acquire and install a
processing system is even made. For the most part they are
58
management issues of which only five will be addressed in
this chapter.
a. Need and purpose. Although the justification for
installing the original System-20 on board the U.S.S.
CARL VINSON was to satisfy a perceived need in the
area of planning an control, a comcommitant purpose
for the small WANG processor was never clearly
defined. This failure to fix and control the specific
applications that should be run on the WANG System-20
resulted in its being used in several ways that had
little to do with planning and control. To complicate
the situation even more, the coterie of users was
expanded to include the ship's department heads. The
combination of expanding the number of users and
allowing new applications to be placed on the system
resulted in an increase in demand that was beyond
the capability of the System-20 to fulfill. To meet
these demands, the ship began a series of upgrades.
Each upgrade replaced a predecessor that had failed
to satisfy the ship's insatiable demand for
processing, until the VS-100 was installed in July
1981. If a thorough requirements analysis had been
performed on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON before the
procurement of the first System-20, the true needs of
the ship could have been recognized. This in turn
would have resulted in a more efficient and effective
method of acquiring a suitable processing system for
the ship.
b. Life Cycle cost. Prior to investing in an actual
processing system such as the WANG VS-100, an
economic feasibility study should be conducted in
order ascertain if the system is too expensive for
the benefits it will provide. This is usually
determined by a thorough cost/benefit analysis.
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There is no evidence that a cost/benefit analysis was
ever performed on any of the WANG Systems installed
on board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON. Two different
members of the ship's management department made the
comment during an interview that much of the software
for the VS-100 was free, i.e it was provided by WANG
when the system was installed. While initial cost may
have been zero, the maintenance cost must still be
considered. Another member of the management
department indicated that consumable supplies (Disk
packs, tapes, etc.) are costing approximately
$100,000 a year. In addition, $475,000 in repair
parts were bought for the WANG VS-100 during FY 1984.
These parts were not used, but placed in storerooms
in the event they are needed. These are just a few of
the cost that should have been considered before
system implementation. Although other cost figures
were unavailable it would not have been difficult to
work up a reasonable life-cycle cost estimate before
making the decision to implement the system. The
benefit side is much more difficult to quantify. In
addition to the advantages discussed earlier in this
chapter, the WANG VS-100 System has undoubtedly
streamlined several operations on board the ship
which has resulted in the savings of thousands of
manhours. Some of these manhours could be quantified
and translated into dollars, while others that cannot
be identified result in improved administrative
operations for the ship as a whole. It would not be
unreasonable to find that the savings were actually
as high or higher than the cost.
c. Operational feasibility. This is concerned with the
effect the system will have on the people who are
going to use it, and in turn the effect the people
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will have on the system. The effect that ship's
personnel had on the expansion of the WANG Systems on
board the U.S.S. CARL VINSON has been discussed
throughout this Chapter. However, the effect the
system had on ship's personnel and other systems is
just as dramatic. For example, two major concerns in
this area are job displacement and manning
considerations. As of October 1984, there were 11
personnel assigned to the WANG division within the
management department. Three of these personnel were
petty officers and two of them were designated
strikers in the data processing rating. This means
that six of the eleven personnel were recruited from
other divisions within the ship to work in the WANG
division, three personnel that had been assigned to
the ship for the Snap program had been placed in the
WANG division, and two personnel were either
recruited from another division on board the ship or
taken out of the ship's Snap II manpower complement.
This raises an interesting question as to whether the
Snap division on the U.S.S. CARL VINSON is being
adversely affected by having five technicians that
were originally assigned to the ship as part of the
Snap I program actually working in the WANG division.
Whatever the case, this type of manning decision was
dictated as a direct result of the WANG's rapid
expansion and lack of Navy manpower support for the
WANG system. The issues to be considered under
operational feasibility must therefore address the
impact a particular system will have on other
shipboard systems by creating an increased demand for
scarce resources such as technical manpower.
Security issues. Security issues must be addressed
and dealt with throughout the life of the system. In
61
an environment such as exist on board the U.S.S. CARL
VINSON, where sensitive and classified information is
prevalent in virtually every department, security of
information is paramount. The engineering department,
which had originally been using the VS-100, has moved
most of its files to a WANG PC to prevent a possible
compromise. Likewise, the VS-80 System located in
the combat information center is completely isolated
to prevent the compromise of highly classified
information.
Security of unclassified information must also be
considered. While the WANG VS-100 has an extensive security
system that requires both a code and a password, besides the
federated management system previously discussed, the
system has two ways in which security can be bypassed. The
first way is to obtain system administration rights. All
members of the WANG division are granted these rights, which
allows them to access any files within the system. To reduce
the potential for abusing this privilege, certain
precautions can be taken. One such precaution is to ensure
that all personnel given system administration rights come
under the purview of the Navy's Personnel Reliability
Program (PRP). This is a program which certifies personnel
who are required to work with sensitive information or
equipment. It is not clear whether the PRP was used within
the management department on board the U.S.S. Carl Vinson.
The second way that unauthorized entry to sensitive
information could occur is by monitoring the cables
connecting the peripheral devices and terminals to the CPU.
Since all cables connecting remote terminals or PC's run in
open cableruns, often through unmanned compartments, they
could be monitored at numerous points with equipment that is
readily available on board ship. Using this technique,
someone bent on malicious destruction or sabotage of
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information could easily obtain the frequencies generated by
authorized users logging into the system, and later
duplicate these same frequencies to access files. Security
is an issue that must be addressed before a system is
procured, as well as, throughout its entire life-cycle.
G. CONCLUSIONS
The implementation of the WANG VS-100 System on board
the U.S.S. CARL VINSON was perhaps done too quick. Instead
of doing a requirements analysis and then selecting the
system, the system was selected and applications developed
after the fact. While backwards, this method does have its
advantages. The primary one is that it allows the user to
experiment with novel ways in which to use the system.
Sometimes a new and innovative application is developed that
serves to justify system cost better than those applications
for which the system was intended.
Many of the disadvantages of the VS-100 are
disadvantages only because the system is not standardized
and supported by the Naval supply system. This is the reason
the ship had to procure and stock repair parts costing
$475,000. Had the WANG VS- 100 been a common system within
the fleet supported by the Naval supply system, the ship
would not have had to tie up so much money in repair parts.
The WANG is a reliable system as demonstrated by its
lack of significant casualties on board the U.S.S. CARL
VINSON, but this very reliability could result in future
problems for the ship. Personnel on the U.S.S. CARL VINSON
are becoming too dependent on the system. As more
applications are added to the system, it will become even
more indispensable to the ship. On the other hand, as the
system ages it will likely become less reliable. Parts will





The Shipboard Non-tactical Automated Data Processing
Program (SNAP) was designed to provide surface ships and
submarines of the U.S. Navy with a standard, information
management system. This program has three primary purposes:
1. Reduce the ever growing administrative work- load
associated with maintenance, supply, financial
management, and personnel administration.
2. Provide a responsive, flexible facility for shipboard
management.
3. Improve the accuracy and timeliness of ships' reports
to other commands, without increasing the ships'
administrative work-load.
The original goal of the SNAP program was to meet the
Chief of Naval Operation's ( CNO ' s ) Objective Number 5 of
1980. This objective was intended to alleviate "the
administrative burden on fleet units." [Ref. 37] The SNAP
concept has been developed as two separate programs. SNAP I
for larger ships of the fleet, and SNAP II for smaller
surface ships and submarines.
1. SNAP I System
The SNAP I non- tactical computer system is the
replacement for the AN/UYK-5(V) system which has been in use
in the fleet and in Marine Air Groups since the mid-1960' s.
SNAP I is designated the AN/UYK-65 ( V) , non-tactical ADP
system. Eventually all the larger ships of the Navy will
have SNAP I systems installed, including the carriers,
repair ships, supply ships, and amphibious ships, and the
Marine Air Groups (MAG)
.
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SNAP I started in 1974 when a plan was approved for
the replacement and upgrade of the AN/UYK-5(V) system, which
by then was obsolete and experiencing maintenance problems.
A two stage implementation plan was finally approved in May
1977.
The first step included the replacement of several
hardware units, including tape drives and line printers that
had been experiencing many maintenance and operational
problems. This step was completed in May 1980. The second
step in the implementation process included the replacement
of the remaining hardware with commercially acquired,
off-the-shelf, processing equipment. This was paralleled by
an upgrade in application software to handle on-line, real
time processing.
Honeywell Information Systems International Inc.,
was selected as the prime contractor for SNAP I in June
1982. The Honeywell DPS-6 series computers are installed as
a distributed processing system and are arranged in one of
four basic configurations depending on the mission and type
of each ship. [Ref. 38] A total of up to 221 DP-6 systems
are to be purchased for installation on 67 ships, 17 MAGs,
and 26 selected shore sites (SIMAs, training sites, Naval
Air Stations, etc.) All the shipboard equipment
installations are to be completed during fiscal year 1985
[Ref. 39]. The projected life-cycle costs for the SNAP I
system are estimated to be:
1. Software Development Costs $127,389,000
2. Software Maintenance Costs $319,914,000
3. Hardware Acquisition Costs $420,600,000
4. Ship Alteration/Installation Costs $ 74,307,000
[Ref. 40]
By October 1984, seventeen of the eighty-five phase
two equipment replacements had beed completed. Many of the
real-time (RT) application programs were being tested in
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fiscal year 1984 and were scheduled to be implemented during
the following two years. Until these programs are ready, the
AN/UYK-65(V) systems have been emulating the AN/UYK-5(V)
computers, processing data in batch mode, with key to disk
data entry. [Ref. 41]
2. SNAP XI System
SNAP II systems are scheduled for installation on
452 ships between the fiscal years 1983 through 1988. The
basic philosophy behind SNAP II is to provide a system that
is centrally procured, designed and managed, which can be
operated and maintained by users who have little knowledge
of computers. This is different from the SNAP I systems,
which require a a staff of computer technicians and
operators. The SNAP II systems are designed to be highly
reliable, requiring a minimum of shipboard maintenance and
repair. The premise underlying this concept is that no
additional shipboard personnel are required for the
operation and maintenance of the SNAP II system! Instead,
personnel already assigned to the ship with appropriate
technical backgrounds, i.e. Electronic Technicians ( ET
)
will be trained to operate and maintain the system. They
will perform these duties on a collateral basis along with
their primary duties. Thus, SNAP II computers are designed
to run without operators in an unmanned space, while users
interact with the computer via remote terminals at various
locations throughout the ship.
The SNAP II systems use application programs written
in COBOL, but allows the users to write and run their own
programs in BASIC, MUSE IV word-processing language, or AZ-7
report/query generator language. The application software,
provided and maintained by the Navy Management Support
Systems Office (NAVMASSO), cannot be directly interfaced or
accessed by user generated COBOL applications. This
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limitation is intended to protect against intentional or
inadvertent modification of the SNAP II application software
and databases.
The hardware used in the SNAP II systems, designated
AN/UYK-62 (V) , comes in one of four standard configurations
depending on ship type and class. SNAP II systems use Harris
series-300 minicomputers and other commercial
"off-the-shelf" peripheral equipment ruggedized for
shipboard use.
While the SNAP I and SNAP II systems have different
hardware architecture, they have similar software design
specifications, with some of the application software
capable of running on both systems with only minor
modifications. The application software is designed and
developed by the NAVMASSO, who is the Central Design
Activity (CDA) for both systems. Because of these
similarities in the management and functionality of the two
systems, only SNAP II will be reviewed in greater depth . It
is the design, development and management of this SNAP II
system that is the focus of this chapter.
B . BACKGROUND
SNAP II systems are intended to provide the smaller
surface ships and submarines with an automated data
processing capability.
One main problem faced by shipboard commanding officers,
has been the ever-growing administrative and management
burden placed on their ships.
"The continued emphasis on decreased shipboard manning
levels has traditionally addressed only the operational
requirements and overall impact on shipboard combat
readiness. The Commanding Officer, however, has few
tools beyond personal leadership to cope with the
administrative burden." [Ref. 42]
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This problem has been the theme of several research studies
over the past decade. The SNAP II system represents the
culmination of that research for improving productivity in
the fleet.
1. The U.S.S. DAHLGREN Study
In August 1972, the Chief of Naval Operations
(OP-91) directed a study into the potential use of automated
data processing on board combatant ships to support
maintenance and material management (3-M), personnel
administration, and supply. The U.S.S. DAHLGREN (DLG-12)
was selected as the site for this study. [Ref. 43] The
non-tactical ADP system installed and tested on U.S.S.
DAHLGREN in January 1973 was a Data General NOVA 1200
"minicomputer" with a 32k-word core memory, one printer, one
teletype, a disk system, and four CRTs. The operating system
supported a limited multi-user environment, which used a
swapping mode of time slicing. It also supported the BASIC
programming language. The application software developed
and implemented during the study was Computer Integrated
Instruction (CI I) and Shipboard Training Administration
System ( STAS ) . CII was an online training program for
shipboard instruction in General Damage Control, while STAS
was used to manage a personnel training database system as
well as a Personnel Qualification Standard (PQS) tracking
system. Both systems were developed off-ship by Naval
Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) and
installed and prototyped on board the U.S.S DAHLGREN.
[Ref. 44] From the study report, issued in December 1974,
four primary conclusions can be drawn:
a. Commercial off-the-shelf hardware can effectively be
used in the harsh environment of the small combatant.
b. The off-ship development of software by the Navy
Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC)
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proved to be a highly effective method of providing
high quality application software without increasing
the work load for shipboard personnel.
c. There were not enough CRT terminals and teletypes to
adequately support the training and management
applications
.
d. The use of computer systems for shipboard
non-tactical applications was shown to be an
effective means to improve productivity in damage
control training and in training management.
After several primary users of the NOVA 1200 system were
transfered to other commands the system fell into disuse.
As a result of this disuse and the lack of "command
attention", the NOVA 1200 system was removed from the ship
in December 1974.
2. The U.S.S. GRIDLEY Study
In early 1975, the U.S.S. GRIDLEY (CG-21) was chosen
for a second study to be conducted under the direction of
NPRDC. Using the Data General NOVA 1200 mini-computer
system, NPRDC implemented 19 management applications that
were previously developed for U.S.S. DAHLGREN. The programs
were so successful that in 1978 the Data General system was
replaced with a larger, more capable Digital Equipment
Corporation, PDP 11/60 computer system. The new system
supported Pascal, BASIC Plus, Fortran IV, and COBOL in a
multi-user environment. Because the U.S.S GRIDLEY already
had data systems technicians assigned in addition to the
dedicated personnel working on the system, they were soon
running ship developed applications, which included
automating a 23,000 line item supply inventory, the crew's
personnel records, and the Coordinated Ship's Maintenance
Project (CSMP). [Ref. 45]
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While several conclusions can be drawn from the
lessons learned in the U.S.S. GRIDLEY study, one point was
clear from the onset. Command "support and interest" made
the difference between success and failure. Other
conclusions of the study [Ref. 46], include:
a. Shipboard personnel are capable of developing
applications that effectively reduce the manual
work-load, but the time required to do so is
prohibitive, and the results are not of equal quality
for all commands. The real payoffs come in the
transfer of operating application software to other
commands, without additional development costs.
b. Off-the-shelf commercial hardware could be used to
provide automated data processing on board small
combatants despite the harsh environment of salt air
and constant movement due to the ship's pitching and
rolling.
c. Major supply functions, like inventory material
management of on board repair parts, could be
maintained on hard disk drives, requiring only 3-4
megabytes of disk memory.
3. The U.S.S. COONTZ and U.S.S. RADFORD Study
In March 1980, the Commander Surface Forces Atlantic
Fleet (COMNAVSURFLANT) authorized a NPRDC study on the
shipboard use of microcomputers for word processing and
other data management applications. The U.S.S. COONTZ
(DDG-40) and the U.S.S. RADFORD (DD968) were chosen as sites
for the study. Alpha Micro AM-1031, microcomputers with 256
KB main memories, and 16-bit central processing units were
leased and installed. The systems included Winchester 10
megabyte hard disks, video display terminals, and printers.
All were connected with standard three pair shielded cable.
A data management system, called AMS developed by Applied
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Micro Systems LTD., and a word processing system, called
ALPHAWORD, were provided with the leased systems. These
systems used a multi-user, multi-tasking operating system,
handling up to six users at a time. Power was provided by 60
Hz voltage transformers.
During the one year study there were no system
malfunctions, even though both ships made extended six month
deployments, subjecting the systems to high seas,
temperatures of 85-95 degrees, and humidity between 75-85%.
This demonstrated the high reliability of commercial,
off-the-shelf hardware in the shipboard environment. Each
ship had two maintenance men who had received only two weeks
of training in system maintenance. [Ref. 47]
Although more than 80 data management applications
and 200 word processing applications were developed, there
was a significant difference in the use of the Alpha Micro
systems by the two ships. On the U.S.S C00NTZ, the
Commanding Officer became heavily involved, acting as the
head systems analyst. He had his data systems technicians
chief (DSC) spending 45% of his time on the system. The ship
made extensive use of both the data management system (DMS)
and the word processing systems. On the other hand, U.S.S.
RADFORD assigned a data systems technician second class
(DS2) to maintain and operate the system on a collateral
duty basis. Although the word processing application was
well used, few DMS applications were developed,
demonstrating that the quality of shipboard software
development is proportional to the amount of attention and
support provided by the command. [Ref. 48]
The conclusions of this study provided a valuable
insight into the use of microcomputers for shipboard
non-tactical automated data processing. The primary lessons
learned were [Ref. 49] :
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a. The use of computers has a significant' impact on
reducing the administrative work-load in the fleet
and contributes to operational efficiency.
b. Data management applications can be developed by
shipboard personnel, but only with significant
command support and manpower.
c. Many commercially available microcomputers are
reliable and compatible with the shipboard
environment
.
d. Six keyboard video display terminals (KVDT) provided
with the systems were insufficient to adequately
support data entry.
Although the study was completed after much of the SNAP II
planning had been done, it supported the viability of the
SNAP II concept. It also addressed the need to deal with the
proliferation of microcomputers in the fleet.
4. SNAP 1 1 Concept Development
In 1978, the conceptual idea of SNAP II was
approved. The Mission Element Needs Statement (MENS) for the
system was approved in May 1980. It outlined the requirement
for an automated system to reduce the administrative burden
on the fleet. The proposed program was to be a centrally
managed and coordinated effort to provide non-tactical
automated support to every ship in the fleet. The
philosophy was that functional requirements and interface
requirements were the "same" for all ship types, even though
the hardware requirements might differ. Therefore, a
standard Management Information System (MIS) could be
created around these same functional specifications.
[Ref. 50]
In 1979, the Automated Data System (ADS) development
plan was written. It was reviewed by the various functional
sponsors and fleet commands. Based on this ADS plan, SNAP
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II was prototyped, using leased WANG VS-80 computer systems
and peripherals, and application software developed by the
Navy. The purpose of prototyping was: 1) to prove the
viability of the SNAP II concept, and 2) to refine the
"concepts and strategies preparatory to seeking authority to
develop the Automated Information System (AIS)" [Ref. 51].
The Functional Description for the SNAP II,
Shipboard Data System (SDS) was issued in March 1981, by
NAVMASSO, with the overall goal of automating six primary
functional areas. See Table II .
TABLE II
SNAP II Functional Areas
1. Supply 4. Maintenance
2. Pay/Disbursing 5. Personnel
3. Administration 6. Medical/Dental
Since SNAP II was designed to be run by users with
minimal computer training, the decision was made to have the
SDS operate on an interactive menu driven basis with on-line
assistance available. Also, the databases were to be
maintained and supported by an online mass storage (disk)
system, with enough storage capability to hold the databases
and still have enough reserve for future growth.
The initial release of the application software was
an attempt at going for the "quick victory" to gain support
of the user communities, while later releases were to
include greater depth and scope in the applications
provided. The first release of SNAP II SDS was developed
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concurrently with the hardware acquisition so that it would
be operationly certified by the time of the first hardware
delivery. [Ref. 52]
One early problem encountered was getting
concurrence on the functional specifications for the various
SDS subsystems. This was primarily due to different
procedures between the Atlantic fleet and Pacific fleet
commands, as well as differences between ship types and
sizes. The most difficult point to sell was that SNAP II was
not just an automation of existing procedures, but rather a
total replacement of existing procedures with an integrated,
automated system. In the end, the functional sponsors for
each of the subsystems designated the procedural
requirements to be included in the initial release of SDS.
In all, nine distinct subsystems were planned. See Table
III [Ref. 53 1.
TABLE III
SNAP II SDS Subsystems
1) Systems Management 6) Pay/Disbursing
2) Corrective Maintenance 7) Personnel
3) Preventative Maintenance 8) Administration
4) Aviation Maintenance 9) Medical.
5) Supply Financial
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5 . SNAP 1 1 System Acquisition and Selection
In November 1981, the Naval Sea System Command
issued a contract to Systems Management American (SMA) Inc.,
"for the acquisition and logistical support of the ADP
hardware, software, and related services for SNAP II"
[Ref. 54]. This contract was expected to exceed $200
million over its 20 year life-cycle. It was issued to SMA
as a Small Business Administration "8(a)" set-aside, which
is part of a Minority Small Business and Capital Development
program to "promote equal access to government contracts"
for those who are both socially and economically
disadvantaged [Ref. 55]. SMA Inc., is owned by Herman E. .
Valentine, who is president and corporate chairman. In 1982
SMA was ranked nationally as the 32nd largest, "black owned"
company in the United States, with gross revenue of about
$17 million. One year later, sales topped $31 million, with
75% of the revenue from Navy contracts. This changed SMA
national ranking to 17th. [Ref. 56]
The Navy contract calls for SMA to act as the
"system integrator" acquiring, ruggedizing, and integrating
the computer system components. The acquisition of the
system components was to be through a competitive selection
process wholly controlled by SMA. The use of an integrating
contractor for SNAP II had the advantage of reducing the
extensive time delays and complexities of a major system
acquisition, and gave the Navy a single contractor to deal
with in resolving all hardware and system software problems.
The SNAP II selection process was conducted by SMA
in November 1981, with seventeen vendors submitting
proposals. See Table IV for the list of bidders. [Ref. 57]
The selection was made by "SMA's technical and managerial
staff, augmented by consultants from private industry and
Old Dominion University" [Ref. 58].
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TABLE IV
Vendors Bidding on SNAP II Requirements
C3 (Convergent Techno].ogies) Harris
C3 (Perkin Elmer) Honeywell




Federal Data (TI) Miltope
G. E. Aerospace Wright Marketing
Memorex
•
By December 1981, the field had been narrowed to
three proposals which had been selected for further
evaluation. These included Data General, Harris, and
Honeywell. All other proposals evaluated by SMA were deemed
unacceptable. [Ref. 59]
On December 23, 1981 SMA completed the evaluation
process and announced the selection of the proposal bid by
the Harris Corporation. The Harris 300 computer . systems had
been selected for SNAP II even though they had never been
used in any major business system applications.
An interesting point here is that the functional
specifications for the SNAP II system called for it to be
fully compatible with SNAP I to allow the transfer data
files between systems. Only a few months after SMA's
selection of the Harris computers for the SNx^P II system,




In January 1982, the performance validation testing
was conducted on the proposed Harris system. The test
results showed that the system was having problems with the
Performance Validation Instruction Package Software. After a
second revalidation test later that month only one
discrepancy remained, which dealt with the interpretations
of "response" and "response time" [Ref. 60]. The Harris
system finally passed the benchmark tests in early February
1982, with 20 successful runs and an average response time
of less than 3 seconds, as called for in the functional
specifications. From their evaluation and analysis of the
work-load requirements and data available from NAVMASSO, SMA
recommended memory requirements for the Harris 300 computers




Since the Harris equipment is expandable to 3.0Mb, it
appeared to meet the system specification requirements.
[Ref. 61]
In March 1982, the Commanding Officer of the
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR)
expressed concern about the hardware selected by SMA for the
SNAP II system. After two demonstrations of the proposed
hardware systems, it was clear that some of the
specifications identified in the contractual Statement of
Work (SOW) were not being met. The specific items identified
included the following [Ref. 62],
a. The system had an inadequate diagnostic system for
system maintenance.
b. The Harris 300 minicomputer had never been proven in
a major business application.
c. There was no uninterruptable power source to assure
power during outages.
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d. • The keyboard video display terminals were not
provided with editing keys for text editing, or with
user adjustable brightness/glare controls.
e. The response times were slower than called for in the
specifications
.
f. The system provided no "fail soft" protection for the
subsystem levels of operation
g. There was no word processing capability.
h. The printers were all from different manufacturers,
meaning that there was no printer family
inter-operability and that there would be increased
logistic requirements for repair parts.
While none of the deficiencies cited by COMOPTEVFOR were in
themselves insurmountable, they pointed out a basic problem;
the hardware specifications defined in the Statement of
Work, USN Solicitation N00024-81-R-7165 , were not being
fully complied with by SMA.
The Harris 300 series minicomputer had been modified
to meet size requirements of the design specifications. This
required changing the circuit boards from their original
vertical configuration, to a horizontal position and
reducing the ventilation space above the computer circuit
cards. A direct result of this was: 1) the natural
ventilation past the circuit cards was lost, 2) the circuit
boards warped in the horizontal position causing them to
make poor contact with their connectors, and 3) they
presented an excellent surface for the accumulation of dust
from unfiltered air, further reducing heat transfer from the
boards
.
After extensive testing and evaluation, the first




6. Operational Test and Evaluation of SNAP 1
1
During the period of March 7-18, 1983, an
operational assessment of SNAP II was conducted on board
U.S.S. SIDES. COMOPTEVFOR described the system as
potentially operationally effective, but not operationally
suitable for shipboard use, and recommended that it not be
approved for fleet introduction. [Ref. 63] During the test,
designated OT-IIA, the SNAP II system was thoroughly
evaluated according to the performance standards provided in
the systems test plan. The results of OT-IIA pointed out
several problems with the SNAP II system provided by SMA.
[Ref. 64]
a. The response time was slower than the design
specifications
.
b. Any user could use job control language to change the
ownership and attributes of the files in the central
database, without setting off an alarm or leaving an
audit trail to indicate actual or attempted entry
into the restricted files. While the SNAP II system's
data files are unclassified, the database does
contain information covered by Privacy Act
regulations as well as financial accountability data
for disbursing, ships' store, food service, and
supply management.
c. The size and weight of the system installed on board
U.S.S SIDES was far beyond the design specifications
provided in the functional description. They called
for a system which would be no larger than 26 inches
wide by 60 inches tall (so it would fit through a
standard hatch) and weigh no more than 130 pounds.
The SNAP II system weighed an unbelievable 2257
pounds and was mounted in a dual cabinet that was 26
inches by 70 inches by 48 inches, thus presenting a
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significant problem for installing these systems on
submarines and smaller ships in the fleet.
d. Unfiltered air was being drawn through the computer
cabinets and keyboard video display terminals (KVDT),
causing dirt accumulation on the circuit boards and
internal components.
e. The magnetic tapes and floppy disks produced on the
SNAP I system could not be loaded into the Harris
system. This data transfer was required for passing
maintenance related job orders from the Current
Ship's Maintenance Project (CSMP), as well as other
supply related data.
f. The system operator/coordinator considered the SNAP
II system too slow, and not user friendly. This
situation could only get worse as more application
programs are added to SNAP II. Also, there was
insufficient space for the users at the work stations
and around the computer itself.
g. The concept of providing system coordinators and
maintenance personnel with only two weeks of training
on the SNAP II system did not appear to provide them
with a sufficient knowledge of the system and its
capabilities. The users and system managers were
unaware of a several functions and procedures
available on the system.
h. The non-standard keyboards provided with the system
were difficult to use, even for an experienced
typist
.
These issues, as well others, lead to the
recommendation by COMOPTEVFOR that the Navy not procure any
additional SNAP II systems until they have successfully
passed an operational test and evaluation examination to
ensure the system meets requirements. [Ref. 65]
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Only two weeks before OT-IIA, the Naval Sea Combat
Systems Engineering Station had conducted a First Article
Test Afloat of the SNAP II system installed on the U.S.S.
SIDES. This test was to verify the installation procedures,
to establish a base line production configuration, and to
verify many of the same functional requirements later
inspected during OT-IIA. On March 1, 1982 they reported a
successful First Article Test and recommended system
procurement and implementation [Ref. 66]. Based on that
recommendation, in May 1983, approval was granted for the
procurement and installation of the first 40 SNAP II
systems. Acquisition authority for the procurement of
additional SNAP if systems was contingent on the successful
completion of a second Operational Test and Evaluation,
designated OT-IIB.
The second operational test and evaluation for SNAP
II (OT-IIB) was conducted on board the U.S.S. FAHRION
(FFG-22) from October 17 to November 2, 1983, while the ship
transited form Mayport, Florida to Rota, Spain. Once again,
OPTEVFOR concluded that the SNAP II system was not
operationally suitable for use in the fleet. This finding
was based on the validation criteria provided in the SNAP II
Test and Evaluation Master Plan 657 (CH-2) of August 8,
1983
. During the evaluation they noted that only 12 of the
20 system discrepancies from the first test (OT-IIA) had
been corrected. The SNAP II system problems noted during
this evaluation included [Ref. 67], :
a. The response time still exceeded the three seconds
maximum requirement of the contract specifications
often taking 30 seconds or longer to respond.
b. The power backup system was not adequate, requiring
the system operators to reboot the system after each
power loss and reset the real-time clock.
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c. 80% of the database applications could not view the
data at the video display terminals, but could only
provide hard copy printouts.
d. The system ran without an operator 75% of the time
(criteria: 90%)
.
e. SNAP II was still overweight and oversized, though a
600 pound power supply had been removed from the
system and the total system weight was reduced to
1496 pounds. (OT-IIA system weight was 2257 pounds)
f. The mean time between failures was 16.6 hours (OT-IIA
was 43.1) while the criteria was established at 2000
hours between failures.
g. The external interface with the Radio Central message
center did not work when paper tape message data was
fed into SNAP II
.
h. The security system still gave a user with access to
the job control language the ability to change the
ownership and or characteristics of a file without
setting off an alarm or leaving an audit trail.
i. It was taking the maintenance personnel an average of
three hours to find and repair casualties, based on
eighteen trials (criteria: 45 minutes).
j. The printers jammed as the ship rolled underway.
k. Dirt still accumulation on internal circuit boards of
the computer and KVDTs because of unfiltered air
drawn through the systems
.
1. There was no room to lay documents near terminals
while typing, and the MUSE IV word processor could
not provide OCR documents
m. Changing circuit boards was extremely difficult
because of the small amount of vertical clearance
between circuit cards and most of interconnecting
cables at the front of the cards.
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The vision of an easy to operate/maintain, user
friendly, highly reliable system was quickly fading. Many of
the functions provided by the system were not used because
of lack of on board expertise. Also, only a few applications
were being programmed by on board users in BASIC or AZ-7
query/report generator languages.
The failure of the SNAP II system to pass the test
and evaluation, OT-IIB, prompted Vice Admiral Baciocco
(OP-098) to express his concern, and desire for a third
operational test later designated OT-IIC. It was clear at
this point that not all the functional design specifications
provided in the contract with SMA could be met by the Harris
Computer System. Also, the software provided by NAVMASSO
would need a great deal more work, if all the application
programs cited in the integrated functional description were
going to be provided.
In December 1983, the Commander of the Naval Surface
Forces Atlantic (COMNAVSURFLANT) consolidated comments from
the thirteen ships of the Atlantic Fleet that had SNAP II
systems installed. The command comments indicated an
overwhelmingly positive response to the SNAP II system.
While problems still existed with SNAP II, the users found
it a significant improvement over manual processing.
"All have praised overall system operation and
effectiveness in achieving the program goal of reduced
admin effort ... SNAP II has dramatically eased the burden
on a minimally manned ship... is unequivocally
recommended for fleet introduction." [Ref. 68 J.
It seems a paradox for the system to be declared unsuitable
for shipboard use and yet receive such strong endorsement
from the shipboard users. The answer lies in the change from
manual procedures to automated processing. While the
statement of work (SOW) defined specific processing
requirements, the users were just happy to have the SNAP
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system on board, even if many of the functional subsystems
of SNAP II were not working up to the technical design
standards. The SNAP II system was providing the ships'
Commanding Officers the tools needed to solve shipboard
management problems.
In March 1984, after a great deal of discussion, the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed that the Master Test
Plan for OT-IIC be modified to include only those "system
requirements and characteristics required for fleet
introduction." [Ref. 69] Only 45 of the 210, specific
requirements, from the integrated functional description,
were included in the revised test plan for OT-IIC. Many of
the specific performance requirements had been eased. ( For
example, the response time requirement was increased from,
less than three seconds, to not less than 6 to 30 seconds
depending on the situation. Also, the mean time for
repairing the system during hardware failures was increased
from 45 to 90 minutes.
The third Operational Test and Evaluation was
conducted in early May 1984 on board the U.S.S. Arthur W.
RADFORD (DD-968). Of the 20 deficiencies from the previous
test, 10 were still unresolved and of the 44 application
software problems, only four were reinspected. The response
times were still slow with an average of 7.7 to 11.5 seconds
with various system loads, and a 41.9 seconds average time
to sign-on the system. Most of those discrepancies from the
previous evaluation OT-IIB remained, except for system
security, which had been improved with software traps to
prevent unauthorized or inadvertent access to system files.
The system's maintenance men easily passed the new standard
of 90 minutes for making system repairs.
Based on the findings of OT-IIC, COMOPTEVFOR, stated
"If satisfying the requirements set forth in the revised
Master Test Plan are adequate for supporting full
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production, then operational effectiveness and operational
suitability support recommendation for full production of
SNAP II." [Ref. 70]
The Deputy, Under Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management granted approval for full production of
the SNAP II systems in June 1984, based on the findings and
recommendations of COMOPTEVFOR from the third evaluation,
OT-IIC. As of September 1984, 56 SNAP II systems had been
installed on surface ships. The rate of installation was
scheduled to be eight SNAP II systems per month until all
452 ships are completed. One problem being encountered by
the fleet commanders has been matching ships' operational
schedules to the dates available for installation. This
problem has been compounded by the lack of authorized Ship
Alterations (SHIPALTS), which must be completed and
authorized before installation of the SNAP II hardware. As
of December 1984, only five of 38 SHIPALTS had been
completed, representing 145 ships. [Ref. 71]
C. ESSENCE OF SNAP II
The SNAP II program was the second part of of a two
phase program for modernizing and expanding the automated
data processing capability in the U.S. Navy. SNAP I was to
replace the AN/UYK-5(V) computer systems installed on the
larger ships of the fleet since the mid-60s, while SNAP II
was to provide an ADP capability to the smaller ships which
were primarily non-automated. With the advent of large
scale integration of computer components with their
increased reliability and declining cost, it was now
economically feasible to provide non-tactical computer
systems to every command in the fleet.
85
The philosophy of the SNAP program was to provide every
surface ship and submarine in the fleet with an automated
data processing capability to support shipboard management
and reduce the manual work load requirements on the crew
used in processing data and directing shipboard activities.
By centrally procuring the system hardware and software,
logistic problems, training requirements, and overall
life-cycle costs would be minimized. Each ship or submarine
would have one of four authorized hardware configurations
depending on ship class and type. These initial
configurations give each command a base-line capability
which can be expanded later.
The primary gains from SNAP II, as reported by Pacific
fleet commands include: 1) better use of assigned manpower,
2) increased accuracy of data sent to shore support
activities, 3) improved ships configuration management, and
4) efficient administrative support. [Ref. 72]
The SNAP II is made up of three primary systems joined
together under the control of a Harris minicomputer. These
include the hardware, the system software, and the
application software. The hardware and system software are
provided under contract with Systems Management American
(SMA) Inc., while the application software is developed,
designed, and installed by NAVMASSO in Norfolk, Virginia.
NAVMASSO is also the central design activity for the SNAP II
system. The application software is primarily written in
COBOL, using a hierarchical modular design to improve its
maintainablity and to support the introduction of later
software releases and additional application program
modules
.
The systems have on-line user manuals, documentation,
and diagnostic systems providing the users and system
operators with easily understood English-like information.
This is necessary because SNAP II systems are designed to be
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installed on ships that do not have ADP experts specifically
assigned for running or maintaining the systems. Instead,
each ship sends crew members to system coordinator and
system maintenance schools, which are about two weeks in
length. The individuals in turn provide the training for the
rest of the users and functional area supervisors.
The schedule for SNAP II installations runs through 1989
and includes 472 sites, both afloat and ashore. The planned
delivery schedule requires the installation of about eight
systems per month during that five year period, and presents
a scheduling nightmare matching available ships with
installation teams, and authorized SHIPALTs. See figure
4.1 [Ref. 73].
Based on the modified requirements from the OT-IIC test
plan, SNAP II is now considered to provide:
1. response times from 6 to 30 seconds
2. mean time for component failure of 2000 hours
3. less than five reboots per day
4. mean time for repairing casualties of 90 minutes
5. 85% system availability
6. unattended operations 65% of the time
The SNAP II system is limited to unclassified data and
programs because of the stringent security requirements
required to store and process classified data on a shared
computer system. This limitation seriously restricts the
amount of operational planning and reporting that can be
done on SNAP II. A possible solution would be to use
stand-alone Zenith 150 series microcomputers with 10 Mb hard
disks which are TEMPEST certified for processing classified
data, but no hard copy would be possible unless the printer
was also TEMPEST certified.
At the time of this writing, the Zenith 120/150
microcomputers were well on their way to becoming a fleet
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Figure 4.1 SNAP Installation Schedule
software applications for SNAP II, several application
programs have been produced for the Zenith systems including
retail operations, food service operations, and disbursing.
These applications do not interface other parts of the SNAP
II database and are thus appropriate for the stand-alone
systems, especially since these are all areas of financial
accountability. [Ref. 74] These application programs are
not scheduled for implementation on SNAP II until after
fiscal year 1986.
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There has been much discussion about providing better
system response time and up-grading the hardware for the
SNAP II system. These areas are discussed in later sections
of this chapter. Other future plans include using
microcomputers to access the Harris computer, instead of the
KVDTs now used. This would permit some of the processing
functions to be off-loaded as well as providing the
capability of running commercial software packages on the
SNAP system.
So far SNAP II has been well received in the fleet, with
most commands concluding that the "economic benefits of the
centralized system outweigh its limitations" [Ref. 75].
Other comments though indicate: 1) there is a general
feeling that there are not enough KVDTs (at least two more
needed), 2) there are some problems with circuit cards
vibrating loose during underway operations, and 3) there is
the need to power the SNAP II system with a "vital" power
source, so it doesn't have to be shut down every time
non-vital power sources are lost.
1. SNAP II Hardware
The Automated Data Processing Equipment (ADPE) for
the SNAP II system is designated AN/UYK-62 ( v) . It is
provided by Systems Management American (SMA) Inc., under a
Navy contract which requires them to purchase, integrate,
and ruggedize the system components. The components are
arranged in one of four configurations, large, medium,
small, and small (submarine). See Table V [Ref. 76]. Each
configuration is nearly identical, except for the number of
peripheral units attached.
a. Processor Subsystem
The Harris 300 super-mini computer is the heart
of the the SNAP II system. Ith uses a 48 bit word-size, plus
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the address and control bits. Internal data is transmitted
in parallel at a speed of 19.2Mb per second. The main
memory is expandable to 3.0Mb, though the current SNAP II
configuration uses only 1.5Mb of random access memory (RAM).
With the addition of a 70 nano-second cache memory and the
expanded memory, the system can be converted into a Harris
500 computer, with operating characteristics similar to an
IBM 370/158 computer. [Ref. 77]
The commercial version of the Harris computer
mounts in an equipment rack that is 80"high by 44"wide by
32 "deep and weighs 1050 pounds. The contract specifications
for the SNAP II system called for SMA to provide a computer
system that was proven in business applications, no larger
than 26 inches wide by 60 inches tall (so that it could fit
through a standard shipboard hatch) , and about 130 pounds in
weight (to meet small ship weight limitations). [Ref. 78]
The SNAP II model of the Harris computer required
significant modification of the "off-the-shelf" version,
since it did not meet any of these criteria. At present the
Navy's SNAP II system is the beta test site for
modifications and changes to the Harris system hardware and
software
.
Additionally, the central processing unit (CPU)
of the processor subsystem includes the communication
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The I/O Subsystem provides the primary interface
SNAP II users. It includes display terminals,
and other I/O devices.
The systems include KVDTs which have an 80
24 line display, and are capable of handling
There are three kinds of printers provided with
SNAP II, including: 1) display printers for making hard
copies of KVDT screen displays, 2) line printers, which run
at 300 lines per minute for volume printing jobs using
continuous forms (5" to 16" wide) and 3) work processor
printers for letter quality printing, capable of using a
variety of different fonts.
Other I/O devices include a paper tape
punch/reader for the interface with the ships' communication
center and a card reader for inputing supply requisition
status cards provided by shore commands. (The tape and disk
drives are listed with the storage devices.)
c. Mass Storage Subsystem
This subsystem includes the devices used to
store the data and software programs for the SNAP II system.
Since the SNAP II system is designed to run without an
operator, most of the storage is on hard disks. The various
configurations provide for two to four Winchester sealed
hard disk drives, with four 8 inch disks and seven
read/write heads. For system back-up there are 9-track
magnetic tape drives, which run at an average speed of 75
inches per second with a density of 1600 bits per inch.
Finally, there are 8 inch floppy disk drives which are used




The power subsystem is provided to ensure an
orderly shut-down of the SNAP II system when there is a
power failure. It includes four types of electrical
line-filters, used to regulate the line voltage to the SNAP
II system.
e. Future Hardware Plans
The future plans for ADPE improvement look
promising, and should solve many of the early problems with
reliability, speed and system size. These plans include
1. expanding the Harris main memory and increasing the
size of the virtual memory addressed by the operating
system
2. using denser hard disks to provide 160Mb per disk
pack
3. reducing both the size and weight of the components
and the equipment rack
4. increasing the number of terminals
5. using portable microcomputers in place of terminals,
fitted with hard disks and up to 600K of RAM, to
allow off-loading of some applications
A current listing of SNAP II equipment manufacturers and
vendors is provided in Appendix A.
2 . SNAP II System Software
SMA provides the system software for the SNAP II
system. The system software includes the operating system,
utility software, and compilers. The Harris 300
minicomputer uses the Vulcan Operating System (VOS), which
is capable of addressing 12Mb of virtual memory. VOS
supports nine high level languages, including: 1) COBOL, 2)
FORTRAN 77, 3) Pascal, 4) TOTAL DBMS, 5) AZ-7 query
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language/report generator, 6) T-ASK information retrieval
system, 7) APC, 8) SORT/MERGE, and 9) MUSE IV word
processing language. Not all these languages are provided to
the ships with the SNAP II systems. The shipboard version
of SNAP II only comes with AZ-7, SORT/MERGE, MUSE IV, and a
BASIC language compiler. Since the application software
provided with the system is written in COBOL, shipboard
users are not allowed to use COBOL. This is done to protect
the programs and database provided with the system.
[Ref. 79]
Since the selection of the Harris computer for the
SNAP II system, there have been problems with the operating
system. The primary complaint has been that,
"the current SNAP II system suffers from inefficiency in
both run-time throughput and response time. Specifically
shipboard users have voiced concerns regarding the
excessive amount of time required to perform routine
functions while utilizing SNAP II." [Ref. 80]
The main difficulty lies with the operating system itself.
VOS supports an indexed sequential file management system
called VISP, which does not allow file sharing. With several
users trying to access the same files, the system soon slows
to a crawl. Other problems cited in one report provide an
insight into some of the VOS problems. [Ref. 81]
a. Alternate indexed files are not efficiently processed
during read and write operations.
b. There is no multiple character suppression in the
indexed files, so large blocks of data must be moved
between the record buffer in the server and the
pseudo buffer in the application programs. This
requires the operating system to allocate large
blocks of dynamic memory, causing a significant
degradation in the system response time.
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c. The lack of multiple character (blank) suppression,
also causes large amounts of disk space to be wasted.
d. Because alternate-key data retrieval slows the system
down so much, programs have been developed which
artificially eliminate the use of the duplicate keys.
This inturn increases the record size and complexity
of the programs.
e. The multi-user version of VISP seems only to be an
kludge of the basic system.
In July 1984 SMA announced a new release of the
operating system, VOS 3.1.1, to address many of the issues
discussed above. In particular, the new release would
provide a new multi-user VISP package and multi-character
blank suppression. That announcement led to the suspension
of almost all new application software development for SNAP
II, while the new operating system was being integrated.
[Ref. 82] This caused a delay in software development of
nearly eight months, until about February 1985. The new
version of VOS improves the response time and performance of
the SNAP II system.
3 . SNAP II Application Software
The application software for SNAP II is designed,
developed, and maintained by NAVMASSO. It has a modular
design so that additional software releases and new
application software modules can be easily added to the
system. This significantly reduces the cost of software
maintenance. The SNAP II Shipboard Data System (SDS)
implementation has been broken up in two distinct phases.
The initial release was designed as a first effort at
reducing the administrative work-load on the ships, while
the follow-on releases are phased enhancements of the basic




SDS has four functional components in its design: 1)
The System Management Subsystem (SMS) directs the overall
operation of the application software for the SNAP II
system. 2) The Organizational Maintenance Management
Subsystem (OMMS) handles all administrative aspects of the
shipboard maintenance program. 3) Supply and Financial
Subsystem (SFM) manages the administrative functions of
shipboard supply and inventory management. 4) The
Administrative Data Management Subsystem (ADM) used in
supporting shipboard personnel and administrative functions.
Additionally, SDS accesses the word processing system
software which has been described by the users as "easy to
use " and a "real time saver". Figure 4.2 [Ref. 83]. shows
the relationships of the primary four subsystems.
a. System Manager Subsystem
The SMS is the control module for the shipboard
data system. It includes functions dealing with overall
system management, system integrity, menu selection, on-line
user manual, and queuing of reports. It is this menu-driven
module that the users must first deal with when logging on
the SNAP system. It not only provides system security, but
also has the back-up and recovery modules required to ensure
the integrity of the databases. A diagram of the major
functions of SMS is displayed in figure 4.3 [Ref. 84].
b. Supply and Financial Management Subsystem
The SFM subsystem provides the basic tools to
eliminate much of the manual supply record keeping and
reporting functions, as well as providing an extensive
inventory management capability. As the systems are
currently implemented, when maintenance data is entered the
status of on board repair parts is provide to the user by


















Figure 4.2 Shipboard Data System (Initial Release)
created to draw the parts from the ship's Supply Support
Center along with the requisition documents necessary to
order replacement parts. If replacement parts are not
carried on board, the documents are created to order them
from other activities, and the system tracks the status of
those parts by work order number, and provides the status
information to the user. The beauty of SFM system is that it
also maintains the financial obligation accounting records




































Figure 4.3 System Manager Subsystem
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consumption expense accounting records, needed for internal
and external reports. Figure 4.4 shows the major functions
provided by the SFM subsystem [Ref. 85].
When parts, consumeables, or services are
purchased through the SFM system, the MILSTRIP data used in
ordering them, is queued and later punched in message format
on paper tape for radio transmission through the ship's
communication center. This feature has saved countless
man-hours and has significantly increased the accuracy of
the MILSTRIP messages. SFM also provides access to the
ship's Consolidated Ships Allowance Listing (COSAL) which
includes lists of the repair parts and components for the
equipment installed on board a specific ship. The automated
COSAL is arranged by Allowance Part Lists (APL), which
reflect the repair parts that a ship is supposed to carry on
board to support repairs. One weakness of the SNAP II
system, cited by many of the users, is its failure to
provide an automated interface with shore commands that
provide the APLs and the COSALs that go into the ship's
COSAL database. In general, the COSAL data have not been
accurate when first installed with SNAP II systems, and the
updates and modifications have to be entered by hand, one
part at a time using the KVDTs. This can be an incredibly
slow process for an APL that lists a thousand repair parts.
This interface problem has been addressed and will be
resolved by 1986 when APL data will be provided to the ships
on magnetic media. [Ref. 86]. There is a certain amount of
duplication in maintaining the COSAL data in the on-line
database, because separate paper copy must also be
maintained, for periods of time when the SNAP II system is
not operational. The functional modules of SFM are displayed

















Figure 4.4 Supply and Financial Management Subsystem
c. Organizational Maintenance Management Subsystem
OMMS is is intended to provide ships with an
automated maintenance management capability. All 3-M
maintenance actions are recorded on-line and merged with the
ship's current CSMP . This data combined with repair part
ordering and status from the supply subsystem can then be
used in the planning and management of maintenance work.
Because of this automated capability, an average of more
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than 50 man-hours can be saved for each repair availablity.
OMMS supports on-line entry and display of maintenance
actions, as well as management reports and scheduling aids.
It provides for work-package processing, work-load planning,
and on-line ordering of repair parts. The functional modules


























Figure 4.5 Organizational Maintenance Management Subsystem
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d. Administrative Data Management Subsystem
The ADM subsystem will eventually contain all
aspects of personnel management and administration (except
classified information management). The initial release of
ADM included functions for monitoring personnel assignments,
training, and career development. In addition the database
supported by ADM is used to track health <& morale programs
and retention programs. The primary complaint from the ADM
users has been the time required to maintain the files for
ADM. The functions provided by the initial release of ADM
are presented in figure 4.6 [Ref. 89].
e. Future Application Software for SNAP II
Over the next three years, there will be
additional application software modules added to the
shipboard data system, as well as improved or modified
releases of the existing programs. The present plan calls
for the following application programs to be added to the
system [Ref. 90] :
Organizational Maintenance Management Subsystem
- 3M for Helo Detachments
- PMS Scheduling & Admin Support
- Technical Publication Library
- Test Equipment Support




- Mobile Logistic Support Force
- Supply & Financial Reports
Administration Data Management Subsystem
- Disbursing & Personnel Management

























Figure 4.6 Administrative Data Management Subsystem
D. ADVANTAGES OF SNAP II
If the success or failure of a shipboard non-tactical
computer system is measured solely in meeting primary design
goal, then SNAP II would have to be considered an
unqualified success, since it has served to significantly
reduce the administrative burden on the fleet. As the SNAP
II system is further developed and deployed over the next
several years, its success will become even more evident.
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The eight points discussed below present some of the more
significant advantages of the SNAP II system.
1. Centeralized Development. SNAP II can be thought of
as a centrally managed, geographically distributed
processing system designed for the U.S. Navy. Each
of the 452 planned nodes of this distributed
processing system will be located on different Naval
ships, but will have similar processing
configurations. Under this view of the system, the
functional sponsors and the fleet commanders act as
the steering committee, making system management
recommendations to the CNO . Therefore, the decisions
on how to manage the SNAP II system take on a more
global, priority and policy, oriented view, than a
system acquired and managed solely by the direction
of one ship. Goals are established for the system at
a high level, which are appropriate to the scope and
cost of a corporate Information System.
2. Standardized System. The standardization that SNAP
II brings the Navy will be far reaching in nature. A
universal system such as SNAP II, results in many
economies of scale over the system's life-cycle. The
training requirements for users is minimized, because
every system is functionally the same. When an
individual has been trained on the SNAP II system,
and is then assigned to a new ship, there is a direct
transfer of his knowledge and skills. Both software
and hardware can be managed so cost of changes and
modifications are minimized."' One can only imagine the
chaos that would result if a major change in
administrative procedures was required, and every
command had to rewrite their application programs to
incorporate the change. With a "single system" you
don't reinvent the wheel each time a problem must be
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solved. Instead the SNAP II concept provides a
single point for the resolution of all problems.
NAVMASSO serves in this capacity.
Improved Logistic Support. The logistics of
providing world-wide support for a standardized
system like SNAP II are obviously much simpler and
more cost effective than attempting to provide for 30
or 40 different systems. Each ship will carry its own
repair parts and expertise in maintaining the SNAP II
systems, yet will be able to provide assistance to
other ships if needed. Repair parts will be stocked
in depth and not breadth, i.e. this allows the supply
system to procure and stock parts that fit all
systems vice unique parts for each system. This
results in better inventory management and economies
of scope.
Increased Accuracy. The increased accuracy, in
reporting parts usage for both corrective and
preventive shipboard maintenance, provides the Navy's
material managers with the necessary data to improve
inventory management. As a direct result the COSALs
will more accurately reflect the ship's equipment
configuration. This leads to better supply support
and consequently improved fleet readiness.
A Management Tool. The manpower savings in going
from a manual system to SNAP II, have been
significant. While SNAP II does not provide many
"bells and whistles", it does provide each command
with the basic tools needed to manage shipboard
administration, without requiring the assignment of
additional crew members who are expert in the system.
A Control Mechanism. The SNAP II system has had a
unifying effect on the entire U.S Navy. By providing
a "single system" for all the ships, policy and
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procedures have been standardized. No longer will
there be the "air" Navy, the "surface" Navy, the
"sub" Navy, and the "Atlantic and Pacific" Navies,
all with different rules and procedures for
maintaining records and processing reports. Now
there will be only one system . . . SNAP ! It provides
the commanders of geographically disbursed
organizations with an excellent control mechanism to
enforce standards and implement policy. When a change
has to be made in administrative procedures it needs
only be developed as a software modification and
released to the fleet.
7. Acquisition Strategy. One main advantage of the SNAP
II acquisition methodology is the use of a prime
vendor who sub-contracts, assembles, and integrates
all the ADPE components and systems software. This
allows the Navy to use one point of contact for
addressing and resolving all system problems.
8. Contractor Leverage. The use of a small contractor,
such as SMA or Harris, offers a distinct advantage
over many larger contractors. When a contract such as
SNAP II, makes up a significant portion of their
total business, they tend to be much more responsive
to the unique needs of the Navy in scheduling,
modifications and other such concerns.
E. DISADVANTAGES OF SNAP II
The disadvantages of the SNAP II system can be argued
from the point of view of the Commanding Officers and what
it provides them in the way of a flexible management tool.
Many of the traditional management issues of shipboard
command involve the solving of dynamic, unstructured
problems, that are not always supported by "canned programs"
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provided by standard, management information system. The
points that follow present some of the disadvantages of the
SNAP II system from this prospective.
1. System Inflexibility. The application software for
SNAP II is designed so the shipboard user cannot
access the databases with locally generated programs..
While this is done to protect the integrity of the
information stored in SNAP II, it incorporates
inflexiblity in a system that must also respond to
dynamic changing needs. It makes little sense to
limit the users to Basic, when Pascal and FORTAN are
also supported by VOS . Also, without a dedicated
SNAP II expert assigned to each ship, it is unlikely
the fully potential of the system will ever be
realized.
2. User Dependence. A growing dependence on the SNAP II
system may not be evident until a major casualty
occurs to the system. Such a casualty could result
from anything from malicious destruction to wartime
damage. This dependency is a huge liability because
an architecture with a single CPU and little fault
tolerance has been chosen for SNAP II. Unless manual
procedures are reheresed and practiced on a routine
basis, the ability to function without the computer
may be quickly lost. Besides, hard copy COSALs and
microfiche listings of repair parts, as well as
technical manuals must still be maintained.
3. Lengthy Implementation. The slow development and
implementation process for SNAP II creates a
situation where there are have's and have-not's.
Those ships where systems have been installed can
exploit its usefulness and profit from improved
management of people, time and money, while those not
scheduled to receive system for several years are
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like second class citizens relegated to operating in
the manual mode. This, along with the usual problems
with application backlogs has led to the
proliferation and use of microcomputers in the fleet.
Some applications scheduled for implementation on
SNAP II, have already been programmed for the
stand-alone microcomputers and are meeting user
needs
.
Classified Data. The issue of handling classified
data in an automated environment was discussed
earlier in this chapter. Since a good deal of
shipboard information is of a classified nature, the
issue must be addressed in meeting the information
needs of the ships. At the present, SNAP II does not
address this problem, other than to say that
classified data will not be processed on the system
without specific approval and appropriate security
measures
.
Contractor Vulnerability. As a result of the
acquisition process, SNAP II is being integrated and
provided by a small company whose primary business is
that Navy specific contract. Also, the computer
hardware comes from a company whose computers are
primarily used by the Navy. This results in a
situation where the government almost has to
guarantee the success and continuance of these
companies, to maintain the viability of the SNAP II
systems. If they were larger corporations with
established track records for performance, the risk
of them closing their doors and going out of business
would be greatly reduced. Once SNAP II is in place,
users will grow to depend on the system and the
information that it provides. The Navy will not be
able to afford the disruption and expense of
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developing another system. Fortunately, the
application software has been developed so that it
can be transported to other hardware systems.
6. Increasing system scope. Since new capabilities are
often added to computer systems under the guise of
software maintenance, the scope and complexity of the
systems are constantly increasing. This situation is
no different with SNAP, causing the programs to look
as though they are growing without bounds as the
maintenance tail of the life-cycle curve continues to
widen, giving the perception of poor management. This
makes it extremely difficult for those who must argue
for funding the SNAP programs.
F. CONCLUSIONS
The SNAP systems have been developed as a tools to make
better use of available shipboard manpower, to increase the
accuracy of the information used in managing the Navy, and
improve the quality and level of support to the fleet. These
are issues that relate to the readiness of the U.S. Navy in
meeting its commitments and in fulfilling its mission. The
research, planning and development that was completed before
SNAP II' s implementation have led to its success in meeting
these goals.
The philosophy of using a "single system" to meet the
information and administration management needs of the Navy
provides many interesting results. Not only are the systems
life-cycle costs controlled, but also almost every aspect of
providing logistics, training, and managing operations, are
simplified. An additional and important feature provided by
the "single system" concept is that of control. The
standardization of procedures and policy, throughout the
Navy as a result of SNAP I and SNAP II, could never have
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been realized under a less centrally developed and managed
system. Once fully implemented in the fleet, SNAP II will
provide a mechanism of control never before possible under
the manual system.
The primary risk inherent in systems like SNAP I and
SNAP II, is the users growing reliance on the information
and data stored on the computers. In a war time environment
it is likely that there will be periods of time when the
crew has to function without the SNAP computer system.
Therefore, the capability to operate in a manual mode must
be maintained if that risk is to be minimized. While the use
of a system with a single CPU may make some sense in the
business world, it poses some strategic problems to a war
ship that is geographically separated and must rely on the
information stored in the database.
Finally, while the acquisition process of major systems
is not be perfect, it is the process we have to work with in
the government arena. When a contract is bid on a lowest
cost basis, you get what you pay for. The only mechanism to
ensure that the system provides product that is needed, is
through the accurate and specific design specifications.
This is where the prototyping of the makes such a
difference. Get the requirements "right" before contracting,
and then stick with the specifications where they make
sense. The objective must be in "getting the right
system... and getting the system right." [Ref. 91]
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The systems discussed in this thesis have illuminated a
spectrum of technical problems and managerial issues that
should be addressed before introducing non-tactical
computers into the shipboard environment. For example, the
Perq minicomputers suffered many technical problems on board
the U.S.S. Carl Vinson, because the hardware was neither
designed nor specifically ruggedized for the oftentimes
harsh shipboard environment it had to operate in. If the
operational environment had been thoroughly examined before
installation of the Perq computers, then different hardware
might have been selected, or at least appropriate protective
devices can be installed installed that would have minimized
some of the equipment casualties that were experienced
during the 1983 cruise. SNAP II, on the other hand,
experienced several technical problems because design
specifications were initially not adhered to i.e. size,
weight, etc., or because they were changed to match
equipment capabilities e.g. response time. Some of the
managerial issues that should be considered if an
implementation is to be successful include manning,
security, applications, and the speed with which the system
should be implemented, to name just a few.
Both the Perq and WANG systems, as installed on the
U.S.S. Carl Vinson, demonstrate some pitfalls that can
occur if implementation is done too fast and without the
benefit of a thorough requirements analysis. In each case
the wrong machines were initially installed. The Perq's were
not hardy enough, and except for the VS-100, the WANGs were
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not large enough. The SNAP system on the other hand, has
suffered from a long, drawn-out implementation process,
primarily because of the extensive procurement process
required for compliance with public law 89- 306 regulations,
often called the Brook's Bill. While the conceptual idea for
SNAP was approved in 1978, only 56 of 452 planned
implementations were installed as of October 1984. This slow
process results in the SNAP design being constantly altered
or adjusted to take advantage of new technology, or to
correct deficiencies in the original design. This means the
first units installed will have to be back-fitted with these
design or operational changes to maintain system
standardization.
Although the Perq computers suffered from equipment
reliability problems, they did demonstrate the advantage of
having a distributed processing capability. Despite
casualties to several of the Perq computers during the
U.S.S. Carl Vinson's 1983 cruise, the network was never
completely disabled because of equipment redundancy. This
redundancy is not provided for on either the WANG VS-100 or
Harris SNAP II systems, because of their single CPU
architecture. The risk of total system failure due to
electrical power problems, malicious damage, or sabotage is
therefore much higher in these systems than on the network
of Perqs.
The term non-tactical is misleading, because it connotes
a system of secondary importance. For shipboard non-tactical
automation nothing could be farther from the truth. With
applications such as the supply-maintenance interface,
intraship communications, and general word and data
processing, these non-tactical computers are becoming more
critical to the everyday operations of the ship. As more
applications are developed for these non-tactical computers,
both system dependency and the penalty for system failure
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increase in magnitude. Along with these increased
applications the risk of a sudden and devastating capacity
crunch becomes much higher. This is what happened on the
smaller WANG systems before the VS-100 was installed. The
Wang System-20, System-30, and VS-80 were too small to
handle the ever increasing demands placed on them by the
ship's users. Whenever a new system was installed it would
reach its capacity limit, resulting in a discernible
slow-down and the inability to satisfy the many new
applications that were being developed by shipboard users.
Another area that must be closely looked at is
life-cycle cost. This includes the original cost of the
equipment, as well as operating and maintenance cost for the
life of the system. Oftentimes, the original equipment cost
is the least expensive part of the life-cycle cost. For
example, a WANG VS-100 super minicomputer with 8 input,
output processor interfaces, a 16 port serial I/O processor
controller, a macroassembler, and one archive processor is
listed for approximately $72,000 on current Federal Supply
Contract schedules. Other vendors can supply comparable
equipment at similar prices. Of course, when you start
adding the cost for hard disk memory, terminals, printers
and other peripheral equipments, the price rapidly
increases. The majority of an information systems cost is
spread throughout its lifecycle as maintenance, repair
parts, wages for operating personnel, and software. These
costs can exceed the original purchase price within a short
time. Although the WANG was specifically used in this
example, these cost hold true for any computer system.
While the WANG installation on the U.S.S. Carl Vinson
has proven the feasibility of using off-the-shelf,
commercial computer equipment in a shipboard environment,
the Perq has demonstrated the necessity for choosing the
equipment wisely. This equipment should include overload
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protection, line protection, and the availability to operate
at different ambient temperatures if a suitable controlled
environment cannot be provided.
B . RECOMMENDAT I ONS
1. Before developing or purchasing a non-tactical
computer system, regardless of size, a cost/benefit
analysis should be conducted. This will help identify
total life-cycle cost, as well as assist in
identifying or justifying the need for such a system.
2. A requirements analysis should be conducted before
committing to a system. This will help in deciding
whether an information system should be purchased,
and if so which one.
3. Both hardware specifications and site preparation
must be well-thought out and defined before actual
procurement of a system. They should address
appropriate power requirements such as line filters,
overload protection, and an uninterruptable power
supply, as well as size and weight constraints,
special environmental requirements, and security and
safety considerations for both personnel and
equipment
.
4. Where available, both commercial hardware and
software should be procured and used.
5. The user should drive application development
whenever possible. Use of a fourth generation type
language such as Nomad, Focus, or similar commercial
products allows the user to develop his own
applications. This is conducive to innovation, while
also minimizing costly software development.
6. Ensure that system architecture is flexible enough
to allow for growth and incorporation of new
technology.
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7. A shipboard non-tactical computer system should be
developed under the same philosophy as other critical
equipments onboard ship, i.e. redundancy. One way to
do this is to use a distributed network whenever
possible
.
8. To encourage user innovation the system should have
some excess capacity that can be used for locally
developed programs. The SNAP concept does this, but
uses the basic language instead of a more flexible,
more user friendly language.
While these recommendations do not in themselves
guarantee a successful system implementation of a
non-tactical computer system, they reflect some successful
aspects of the Perq, WANG, and SNAP II systems, which should
be considered when designing computer systems for the fleet.
Research programs like Perq/ZOG and commercial systems like
the WANG have a definite place in the Navy, and should be
continued, because of the ingenious and innovative ways in
which they are used. These creative ideas can then be
transfered to the more standardized systems like SNAP. As we
view the future, we must continue to look for ways to use
new technology to increase productivity in the fleet.
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Administrative Data Management Subsystem
Automated Data Processing
Automated Data System
Automated Data Processing Equipment
Automated Information System
Allowance Part Lists
CCOL Compartment Check Off List
CDA Central Design Activity
CIC Combat Information Center
CI I Computer Integrated Instruction
CMU Carnegie-Mellon University
CNO Chief of Naval Operation
COSAL Consolidated Ships Allowance Listing
CPU Central Procession Unit
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
CSMP Coordinated Ship's Maintenance Project
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Agency
DCA Damage Control Assistant
DMS Data Management System
DS Data Systems technicians
ET Electronic Technicians
FMS Federated Management System
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GSA General Services Administration
I/O I nput/Output








Mission Element Needs Statement
Management Information System
Message Processing Distribution System
NAVMASSO Navy Management Support Systems Office




Organizational Maintenance Management Subsystem
Office of Naval Research
Operational Readiness System Evaluation
PC Professional Computer
PLAD Plain Language Address
PROMIS Problem Oriented Medical Information System
PRP Personnel Reliability Program





SBA Small Business Administration
SDS Shipboard Data System
SHIPALTS Ship Alterations
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SFM Supply and FinancialManagement Subsystem
SMA Systems Management American
SMS System Management Subsystem
SNAP Shipboard Non-tactical ADP Program
SORM Ship's Organization and Regulations Manual
SOW Statement of Work
SPICE Scientific Personal Integrated Computing Environment
SSTG Ship's Service Turbo Generators
STAS Shipboard Training Administration System
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